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Structuring Migration in a Historical Perspective: The Case of Traveling East Europeans

EWA MORAWSKA

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Structuring Migration in a Historical Perspective: The Case of Traveling East Europeans

EWA MORAWSKA

University of Pennsylvania and
Jean Monnet Fellow, European Forum (1997-98)

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European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
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The swelling volume of international migrations worldwide, a corollary of the rapidly growing interconnectedness of different regions of the earth, has during the last decade become the focus of attention of scholars in all fields of the social sciences. Eastern Europe, progressively incorporated into the world system since the collapse of the Soviet order, has also furnished the increasing number of refuge-, work/income-, and entertainment-seeking migrants. Studies devoted to recent population movements across and outside of that region range from regional and national reports based on aggregate data to ethnographic case studies. Excepting, however, general overwiews that include information about East European flows as part of continental or global population movements (cf. Castles and Miller 1993; King 1993; Gould and Findlay 1994; Cornelius et al., 1994; Fassman and Munz 1994a; Ardittis 1994; Zamoyski 1995; Barkan 1996; Gungwu 1997), thus far to my knowledge there have been no attempts to interpret these migrations within a more encompassing theoretical framework and to assess them from a comparative-historical perspective. I propose here a conceptual model of contemporary travels of East Europeans that effectively joins the macro- and micro- perspectives on international migrations current in the social sciences, and that "treats history seriously," that is, assumes the continued significance of long-dure social processes and certain past events for present developments.

Drawing on illustrations of contemporary international travels of East Europeans, I then apply this model to treat in one interpretative framework the three issues that have attracted considerable attention in recent social science studies of (im)migration: the relationship of globalization and migration processes; then, within this context, the local environments of migration, and, specifically, the diversification of the migration types and coping strategies used by the migrants; and "transnationalization" of the latter's social bonds and identities and its effects on the meaning and practice of the nation-state and citizenship. In each of the discussed issues, I identify and comment upon historical continuities, that is, the enduring impact on the "operation" of present-day migrations of East Europeans of past situations, particularly of macro- and micro-level mechanisms of mass population movements of their turn-of-the-twentieth-century predecessors, and of the embedded sociocultural patterns of the more recent Communist era, and discontinuities or new developments.

The concept of migration as used in this paper denotes one-way as well as repeated movements across nation-state boundaries or within the multinational community (such as the now-borderless European Community) for permanent or shorter- and longer-term sojourns. Treated here as the broadest framework of migration, globalization is understood as a historical process of the increasing "systemness" or interrelatedness of various dimensions (technological, economic, labor, sociocultural, political-military) of social life, and, in consequence, of different regions of the world.[1] This growing interconnectedness is viewed as an uneven, long-dure development whose roots reach deep into the previous century and even earlier and the pace of movement--forward or in reverse--as contingent on circumstances of time and place.[2] The related notion of the world system relates to transnational structures (economic, political, cultural) characterized by

considerable but variable levels of systemness, large but flexible scopes of coverage, and different degrees of openness or closure: one can speak of the Atlantic world system, the Soviet world system, and the global world system (or just global system). Consistent with the theoretical model proposed here, globalization and localism are viewed as noncontradictory, reflecting the mutual "rootedness" of large-scale processes and pursuits of social actors immersed in their microenvironments.

Two caveats are the following. The purpose of this discussion is to "try out" a particular conceptual model as a framework for the interpretation of East European migrations in their selected aspects rather than to offer a representative and appropriately differentiated account of present-day international travels in and out of specific countries in that region (see Arditis 1994; also Morokvasic and Rudolph 1995; Biffl 1997 for good overviews thereof). Related to this purpose but primarily necessitated by the limited scope of this paper has been the use of two aggregate categories in the discussion of present-day, post-Communist (since 1989-90) East European migrations: East Central Europeans (ECE) including Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians, and East-East Europeans (EEE) to denote residents of western parts of the former Soviet Union, including Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, (European) Russians, and Jews. Such joint/separate treatement indeed reflects the existing socioeconomic and political realities in the region and differences in the position of the respective countries/nationality groups in the larger world, but it also conceals differences within the two categories. I note these differences when they are relevant to the particular points in the discussion. When, however, a joint statement about both categories aooear justified, I refer simply to East Europeans (EE).

I. Migration as Structuration Process

Two distinct approaches have been most popular in studies on international migrations. The so-called (macro-)structural perspective represents population movements as generated and sustained by the entrenched discrepancies in the economic development between different world regions and the resulting therefrom systematically reproduced "collective inequalities" between material conditions and life chances of the inhabitants of these distinct parts (see e.g., Piore 1979; Portes and Walton 1981; Castells 1989; Sassen 1988, 1991). In another variant of this perspective the economic mechanisms are complemented by political (state and international) forces that induce or constrain population flows (Cornelius et al. 1994). The functionalist or individualistic approach views migration as the aggregate result of micro-level decisions of individuals who respond to inequalities (real or perceived) in the economic opportunities by changing their place (Lewis 1954; Ranis and Fei 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Zelinsky 1971; Todaro 1969).[3]

Although they continue to inform the bulk of migration analyses, both structuralist and individualist interpretations have been criticized for creating a reified polarization of interrelated forces, and attempts have been made to

reconcile the macro and micro determinants of migration. One such integrative approach proposes to treat individual decisions of migrants as conditioned by contextual forces operating at different levels (cf. Fawcett and Arnold 1987; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992); expanding on the above, another interpretation acknowledges as well the over-time consequences of individual decisions for the surrounding "contexts" (Massey 1990); still other interpretations posit households (Wood 1982; Schmink 1984; Stark 1984; Boyd 1989; Chant 1992) or, more generally, formal and informal social networks (Goss and Lindquist 1995) as the intermediate level articulating mutual influences of actors (migrants) and their environment (social structures).

Informed by a similar assumption of the interdependence of large-scope and local-level processes influencing population movements, the proposed here conceptualization of migration as structuration in a recent reformulation by William Sewell (1992) of Anthony Giddens's notion of "dual structure" (Giddens 1976, 1981, 1984)[4] provides a more analytically sophisticated and encompassing interpretation of the migration phenomenon, better suited to comparative-historical analysis than any of the above propositions.

By making structure consist of schemas or practice-oriented knowledge that makes people capable of purposeful action and resources or concrete means or tools for action that empower group members to pursue their goals the structuration model overcomes the divide between symbolic and material representations of structure implicit in the intepretations noted above. It restores creative human agency to social actors, but, unlike these approaches, builds at the same time the possibility of change into the concept of structure by "pluralizing" and imbuing it with inherent tensions. It views the specific forms of migration, courses it takes, and specific outcomes it brings as inherently contingent on time- and place-specific circumstances and, therefore, never fully determined--the idea which is either absent or unelaborated in the above propositions. The basic premise of the migration-as-structuration model positing the "imperfect reciprocity" of structure and agency resulting, on the one hand, from the multiplicity and polyvalence of situations in actors' everyday practices and, on the other, from the transposability of sociocultural resources applied to different (especially new) situations, refocuses the discussion about migrants' activities from the instant "doing" to continuous "becoming."

The basic idea informing the structuration model of the mutual "rootedness" of micro and macro circumstances that constitute social phenomena, including migration, can be summarized thusly. Whereas the configuration and pressure of forces at the upper structural layers set the limits of the possible and the impossible within which people move, it is at the level of the more proximate surroundings that individuals and groups evaluate their situations, define purposes, and undertake actions the consequences of which, in turn, affect over time these larger-scope phenomena. The following particulars of Giddens's-Sewell's conceptualization of the constitutive components of this reciprocity support the claims of its greater analytical sophistication and theoretical flexibility in comparison with other micro-macro theories of migration.

The schemas that orient people in their life pursuits are "virtual" as an intersubjectively available repertoire of basic guideposts--general principles and strategies of action (Swidler 1986) that are actualized--applied to concrete situations. They are socially constructed in a double sense: as acquired in the process of in-group(s) socialization and as (re)created through the symbolic and behavioral practice of participating in different social groups and institutions.[5]

The other constitutive component of structuration, resources, is "actual"; that is, resources exist in time and space as specific characteristics and possessions of historical actors, and it is their actualization in people's minds, bodies, social relations, and the physical surroundings they control that makes them resources. Resources can be human and nonhuman. Resources of the human kind include, in this case, personal and collective skills of the (im)migrants (especially those "fitting" the socioeconomic organization of the societies they reside in); knowledge of the "rules of operation" of these societies and, particularly, their state and local laws and statutes; contacts with the representatives of the dominant/powerful groups or individuals; deeper and closer to the surface schemas applied in practice to concrete situations, and formal-institutional and informal social networks for instrumental and expressive purposes. Nonhuman resources include animate and inanimate objects. In modern society capital is, of course, the most universal nonhuman resource (although its uses depend on the schema-values of worth, status, and aesthetics). Material infrastructure available to group members collectively and individually and, particularly for (im)migrants maintaining transnational connections, advanced communication technology are important resources.

Sewell's successful attempt to "open up" and dynamize the structuration model (in Giddens's intepretation it is "stabilized" by the ongoing mutual reconstitution of its component elements) by endowing all of its elements--agency and structure and, within the latter, schemas and resources--with a significant transformative potential has been, from the perspective of a historical sociologist of migration, the major attraction of his reformulated framework.

By applying schemas and resources in their everyday practices actors create and recreate different structures or aspects of social life. This reproduction, however, is never ideal. Sewell argues that a highly generalized capacity for agency, that is, for desiring, exploring, and acting creatively, is inherent in all humans; its concrete forms and "contents" are shaped by sets of particular cultural schemas and resources available in time- and place- specific milieux in which people practice. Agency arises from the actors' knowledge of schemas and (some) control of resources, which means the ability to apply these tools to new situations. New situations, in turn, enable actors to reinterpret schemas and redesign resources. As a result, as social actors innovate and devise ways to cope with the world, "plenty of thoughts, perceptions, and actions [that are] inconsistent with the reproduction of existing social patterns" occur (Sewell 1992, 15). This conceptualization is particularly useful for intepretations of the pursuits of migrants who move into or between different environments and confront new circumstances--the situation that in most people mobilizes and

"translates into action" their innovative potential although general life-philosophies or action-orienting schemas/habitus embedded in migrants' group traditions can also release or constrain the former's creativity.

Interpreted in the structuration framework, migrants' activities are neither simply the products of "structures" nor their agentic volitions but of the dialectics of the power to and power over as these actors (re)define and pursue their purposes, playing with or against different structures. How much agentic power individuals can derive, however, from their sociocultural resources is contingent on the enabling or constraining influence of other macro- and micro-structures: dynamism or stagnation of the economy, an open or ethnic-ascriptive labor market, civic-political pluralism or exclusiveness of the receiving society, parochialism or cosmopolitanism of the host culture. Within these intersecting frameworks, the specific fields and scope of individuals' empowerment and transformative potential are further influenced by--changing over time and/or from place to place--their class-, gender-, age- and generation-specific resources and, in the case of contemporary migrants, their legal status in the receiving country. But if "enough innovative people or even a few people who are powerful enough act in innovative ways, their action may have the consequence of transforming the very structures that gave them the capacity to act" (Sewell 1992, 4).

In the above discussion of the agency's transformative potential schemas and resources have been the "objects," so to speak, of the alterations by social actors. But in Sewell's model mutability is also inherent in the structures themselves, and, specifically, in their three characteristics. All of them have already been acknowledged more or less explicitly earlier in the discussion, but it is useful to recall them in this context, especially because they are directly applicable to circumstances of migration.[6]

One such feature is the multiplicity and intersecting of practice-guiding structures in different areas of social life (family, public education, work and economy, popular culture, organizations, government, personal networks, etc.), which exist at different levels (international/global, mainstream/national and local), and operate in different modalities (as longer-dure or immediate-direct influences). Although certain structures, especially economy/employment and state/political, usually have a greater impact than others on structuring migration, particularly in a longer-term perspective, in specific contexts particular configurations of structures and practices can "bring to the fore" factors such as availability of mutual social assistance, need for togetherness, achievement or exploration drive, or even idiosyncratic events in the migrants' immediate or larger surroundings. The multiplicity of structures in actors' everyday practices also means that they are capable of applying in particular situations/areas of life variegated or even incompatible schemas and resources. Over time, continued use of intermixed coping tools can lead to structural reconfigurations.

The second feature of structures that facilitates change is the transposability of schemas as a matrix of inculcated, durable orientations to

action, or generalized modus operandi, that engenders, as a result of the transposability of schemas to different and new situations, different and innovative practices. In addition, the coexistence in migrants' cultural repertoire of strategies for action of a (greater or lesser, depending on circumstances) variety of schemas from different structures facilitates their mutual influence and redesigning. The third characteristic pertains to the resources, namely, their polysemy and transposability to new and different situations encountered by migrants as they pursue their purposes by changing location or by maintaining involvement in several places at once. Transposable and flexible, resources are, therefore, never fully unambiguous as to their potential utility-defining meanings.

II. Large-Scope Structures, Long-Dure Processes, Big Transformations

Contemporary East European migrations as a component part of globalization have roots in the era known as the "long turn of the century" (1870-1914) that witnessed the maturation of modern Western capitalism and the emergence of the Atlantic world system through the accelerated urbanization-industrialization of social life patterns in Europe as well as the Americas, intercontinental expansion of commerce and capital flows, and significant improvements in long-distance transport and communication. The major features of the turn-of-the-century Atlantic world system and, in this framework, of the population flows across and out of Eastern Europe are sketched below in order better to assess contemporary migrations of that region's residents: their volume, destinations, composition, and purposes, as shaped by the configurations of the longer- dure and more recent processes and mechanisms.

Inherent in the emergent Atlantic world system was a profound inequality in the developmental impetus, and in the resulting techno/economic prowess, between its component parts, divided, roughly, along the West-East and North-South axes, into the more (core) and less ([semi-]periphery) modernized regions, respectively. The general pattern of the population movement accompanying these developments at once reflected and contributed to this imbalance. At the turn of the twentieth century, it flowed increasingly, in the form of labor-seeking migration, from the still largely rural, poor, and overpopulated southern and eastern corners of Europe as they were incorporated into the capitalist world-system, toward the urbanized-industrialized western and central parts of the Continent, and then beyond it across the Atlantic.[7] The total volume of westbound "comings" and "goings" (rather than persons, because repeated journeys were common) of East Europeans set in motion during the transformations taking place in their worlds between 1870 and 1914 was a staggering 30 to 40 million. Because it escaped, as it were, the forces incorporating eastern Europe into the Atlantic world system, recorded separately should be 5-to-8-million-person emigration during the same era of Russian peasantry to Siberia and Central Asia.[8]

The specific demands of the industrial economies of the northwestern core receivers, combined with the limited human capital, in terms of modern skills, of

the majority of labor migrants from southeastern (semi-)peripheries, channeled those arrivals into low(er)-level occupational positions. In 1910 such positions were held by more than 90% of Slavic and 65% of East European Jewish (im)migrants in Germany and the United States, the two most dynamically growing industrial powers in the Atlantic world-economy that attracted the majority of South and East European (SE) migrants.[9] (Another factor in this placement, migrants' group support networks will be discussed later in this paper). In this way, the macro-structural inequality between the SE--NW parts of the world system was replicated or, as it were, domesticated, at the mezzo level in the regional/national distribution of the resident work force in the socioeconomic structures of the receiver societies.

The most outstanding feature of the contemporary world system has been its globalization in scope and complexity of interconnections, dwarfing all predecessors. Forces that generate this global system have become more pervasive and also more diversified than the ones that gave shape to the Atlantic world system at the turn of the twentieth century. They include progressive transnationalization of production, capital, and exchange and unprecedented acceleration in technological advancement, particularly innovations in transportation and communication. Related to these have been two major developments: the restructuring of regional and national-state economies and social structures toward high-tech production and services easily relocated in space and the intensification of global diffusion of cultures through actual and, in particular, virtual contact.

Importantly, in part reflecting the unifying trends noted above and in part in reaction to the atrocities of World War II and to the pervasiveness of human misery and oppression in the world perceived at close range or from a (tele)distance, a recognition (schema) of humankind as both global condition and shared identity spread across regions accompanied by a proliferation of world organizations and informal forums founded as resources to improve worldwide cooperation on common concerns, such as human rights, environmental protection, trade, and economic development. The disintegration of the colonial system during the 1950s and 1960s and, more recent and ongoing, of the Soviet block, should also be included in this category of generative factors as developments with globalizing effects. In both cases the profound structural transformations following the collapse of the old system have set in motion millions of people in search of safety, work, and income and/or motivated by the need to explore the world.

Like the more encompassing system of which they are part, contemporary migrations across and out of Eastern Europe are much greater in scope and complexity than their turn-of-the-century predecessors. Although only a fraction, between 9% and 12%, of global movements across state borders (more than 750 million travelers in 1996 alone, of which international tourism as the largest component accounted for 80% of worldwide population flows), estimations of the number of East Central Europeans on the move in the 1990s have been more than double the volume of international travels across and out of that region

during the thirty years preceding World War I.[10] In the former Soviet Union internal migrations, mainly ethnic resettlements and refuee flows, "internationalized" by the secession of the former republics that formed their own nation-states, continue to account for about 85% of current population movements, but since 1993 there has been a notable increase--an indicator of the gradual incorporation of this territory into the global system --of westbound migrations outside of the former USSR, especially among East-East Europeans from the Ukraine, Byelarus, and Lithuania, but also from Russia proper (although in the latter, the long-time leavers, German Aussiedlers and Jews, still make up 70% of the emigrants). Recent opinion surveys about actual and intended (e)migration conducted in these countries report large proportions of respondents, particularly younger urbanites, thinking about or actually planning westbound international migration, either (the majority) to the neighboring ECE countries or farther to Germany and across the Atlantic to North America.[11]

Although it became much more global or interlinked, the contemporary world system (expanded to include nearly the entire globe) has retained three major structural characteristics of its turn-of-the-century Atlantic predecessor (micro-level sociocultural continuities will be discussed in the next section of this paper). First, it continues to function in the context of the enduring inequality along the NW-SE divide in access to and control over techno/economic resources and political/military power. This disequilibrium, pronounced on the world map, has also retained, basically, a similar geographical layout on the European Continent, although not without some important modifications. Namely, whereas the position of the southern countries, included one after another into the EC economic and political structures dominated by its western members, has gradually improved since the 1950s, that of the eastern countries, incorporated by force into the Soviet system, has actually weakened in spite of the accelerated industrialization and occupational restructuring of that region that occurred after 1945. Measured by the per capita GDP, shortly before World War II, in 1938, the economic performance of East Central Europe reached about 44% of the west European level. By the end of the 1980s southern Europe, although still considerably behind the western core with 65% of the latter's per capita GNP, had distanced itself by more than 30 percentage points from its eastern counterpart where inefficient and outdated Soviet-style economies were rapidly deteriorating accross the region.

Although the collapse of the Soviet regime in Eastern Europe opened the door for the accelerated incorporation of that region into the global system, the long-term processes of capitalist perestroyka to overhaul and bring up to date unproductive state-socialist economies have not thus far diminished the gap in economic standing between the eastern and western parts of the Continent. In fact, this gap has considerably increased, especially since the latter have moved in the last two decades into the new technoelectronic or postindustrial era. In 1995, measured by the capita GNP, the economic performance of East Central Europe was only 32% of that of Western Europe and the United States combined, while the ratio of (average) wages between these two parts was 1:5 to 10 (at the turn of the twentieth century, this proportion was "only" 1:3 to 6). In East-Eastern Europe these comparisons are even more dramatic: the per capita GNP ratio was 1:20 and that of wages 1:25 to 40.[12]

Second and related, the continuing SE-NW division of resources and power in the contemporary world-system has also sustained the basic geographic pattern of migrations that continue to flow from the less techno/economically developed southern and eastern (semi-)peripheries toward the northwestern core parts of the globe. The European Continent, itself divided into core and (semi-)periphery regions, since 1955 has witnessed continuous interregional migration along the SE-NW axes, which have been "stretching out" in southern and eastern directions, including, with progressive globalization, increased flows of migrants from still more peripheral parts of the world, such as Africa, the Middle East, and all corners of Asia. It may be noted here that this growing inflow of migrants from LDCs in southern and, more recently, eastern corners of Europe has relativized, as it were, the notion of the "European core." Once exclusively denoting northwestern Europe, with the globalization of migrations the concept has expanded, depending on the standpoint of prospective migrants: it includes southwestern Europe from the perspective of East Europeans, North Africans, and inhabitants of the Middle East and envelops the westernmost countries of Eastern Europe when approached by migrants from the easternmost parts of the Continent and from Asia.

Third, the entrenched SE-NW division of the contemporary world system, and the resulting pattern of the population flows toward its more developed regions have contributed to the persistence inside the socioeconomic structures of the receiver countries of a similar cleavage, with the upper positions dominated by the NW national/ethnic groups and the lower ones by the SE ones. Some commentators have called this phenomenon "the (semi-)periphery of the core." In this regard, too, the recent influx into NW and EC Europe of migrants from the far eastern parts of the Continent and more remote LDCs, relativizes the notions of "core" and "periphery" by elevating South and also, lower in the pecking order, East European migrants--white, better skilled and more acceptable culturally in comparison with the LDC arrivals--higher in the socioeconomic structures of NW receiver societies.

Althought they bear recognizable similarities to the patterns of population movements in the Atlantic world system, however, contemporary migrations of

East Europeans are not their straightforward continuation modified somewhat by the shifted parameters of the global system. Significant new factors have become involved in shaping the volume, forms, and directions of postwar international travels of East Europeans (and, for that matter, of other peoples as well) whose interaction with the enduring patterns makes for a familiar yet quite distinctive picture of the migratory flows.

The development of great consequence for international population movements has been the politicization of the issue of international migration, that is, the question whether, where, and for how long migrants are able to travel. In the Atlantic world system these decisions were by and large the prerogative of the migrants themselves and their local communities, contingent on the general and local economic conditions in the sending and the receiving societies and on availability of transportation. For the receiving societies the selection of entrants, if there was any, was based on individual characteristics of migrants (e.g., their healthy appearance) as evaluated by border officials rather than on group-ascriptive (racial or ethnic-national) criteria set by state immigration policies. (A precursor of the forthcoming "etatization" of international migrations was the German government, which intervened in migratory movements to a considerable extent by limiting the length of stay of the migrant sojourners, particularly those from eastern Europe.)[13] Today, international migrations are intricately entangled in politics and ideology that are negotiated at the "upper structures" of the contemporary global system, although, as we shall see shortly, not without the input "from below" by actor-migrants themselves.

Multiple concerns and interests and different groups and lobbies involved in deciding the size, composition, and directions of contemporary international migrations generate tensions and contradictions that contribute to what Wayne Cornelius et al. (1994) call the gap between the goals of national/regional (im)migration policies of receiver countries and the actual results of policies in this area.[14] The major "players" and most obvious disagreements in the contemporary migration politics have been the following. In favor of permissive immigration policies, if motivated by different interests or ideologies (including declared doctrines or systematized evaluative schemas regarding the existing vs. desired social order and less-formalized national myths and collective self-representations) and equipped with different resources in terms of power to implement and execute relevant laws and regulation, have been, first and foremost, various international and regional bodies proclaiming universal human rights, including the freedom of movement, as the superior principle, in the international and regional bodies[15] as well as, at the national level, groups and lobbies that advocate rights-based liberalism, that is, expanded rights for marginal and ethnic groups, including foreigners. In the same camp are (some) employers, especially in the informal sector of a postindustrial economy (see below), interested in cheap, flexbile, and unprotected by the welfare system foreign labor. Some longer- and/or better-established and organized immigrant groups have or join existing lobbies for open-door immigration policies in their host countries on behalf of all migrants (e.g., Hispanics in the United States) or for their own fellow nationals (e.g., CIS Jews in Germany).

Representing restrictive/selective side are usually the governments of receiver nation-states wanting to maintain social and economic order, and, importantly, control escalating costs of the welfare state. The same governments, however, are constrained in their actions as signatories of international treaties that oblige them to respect human rights and/or by their own civic-political traditions and national self-images as a "nation of immigrants" embracing the world's "huddled masses" (U.S.A.) or the "bearer of universalist values of citoyennete and integration" (France). Immigration restrictions are usually supported also by conservative political parties and civic organizations and by considerable segments of public opinion--citizens, employees, and welfare recipients who feel threatened by growing numbers of "aliens" who compete for jobs and social services in their countries.

A profound economic restructuring of the NW core societies and with them of the global economy triggered by the international oil crisis of 1973 and the severe industrial downturn afterward is another new development to be noted. It has comprised three related processes: an accelerated transformation from industrial to high-tech, services-driven economy and the accompanying shift to short-term, flexible production based on small-size and versatile companies; related to the above and a contributor to as well as a consequence of intensified SE-NW migrations, the rapid growth of the informal (also called "third") economic sector offering variable, usually substandard, wages and no employment security and unattached to the legal-institutional structures of the fiscal and welfare systems; and, under the umbrella of transnational enterprises, a transfer of labor-intensive production to less-developed low-wage countries in Asia, South America, and in the 1980s clandestinely and later openly, to the former Soviet bloc.[16] These transformations were soon to alter--with the aid of or through the loopholes of policies instituted by the receiver countries--the composition of (semi-)periphery-to-core migrations by decreasing, on the one hand, the demand for low-skilled labor migrants and increasing it for highly skilled personnel and, on the other hand, by generating the demand for indocumentado workers in the informal sector of core economies.

Finally, cultural diffusion via global media together with the availability of quick and comfortable long-distance travel, have jointly contributed to the unprecedented numerical growth and global spread of what one may call entertainment migration of which the lion's share is taken by international tourism. A privilege of the elite in the past, by the mid-1960s domestic and international tourism was quickly becoming a mass phenomenon facilitated by the institutionalization of "the right to rest and leisure," a provision in the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the form of paid holidays offered by employers in the signatory countries and by the improvement in transportation. In the developed NW societies vacation travel, especially international tourism, was further fostered as a mass phenomenon by postwar economic prosperity and by the rapid expansion of the tourist industry. In Eastern Europe, mass-scale tourism was made possible by the financial and organizational assistance of Communist welfare states that enabled large numbers of working people to travel on vacations, mostly domestic, but also in

other Soviet-bloc countries.[17]

Like other forms of cross-border population flows, international tourism is at the same time fostered by and itself fosters the globalizing processes. Its main routes and actors, however, are significantly different from those considered above. Its most distinguishing feature is that, rather than following "compass" or SE-NW flows like the bulk of economic and political movement, most of international tourism--more than 75% of both its total volume and the revenues accrued thereof--moves between the highly developed countries.[18] The other distinctive feature of international tourism relevant to structuring of East European migrations has been its comparatively lesser politicization vis a vis other forms of migration--only comparatively and selectively, however, because a closer look at its mechanisms reveals reflections of both long-dure world political order and more immediate political developments. In the case of interest here, the pending inclusion of ECE countries into the European Union opened the door to the migrants from the former to the northwestern parts of the Continent (but not to the United States) by eliminating entry visas for short-term visitors. This privilege has not been extended to East-East Europeans; as of recently, however, the latter can enter most of ECE as tourists without visas.

The most striking effect of the above developments has been heterogenization of the types of international population movements in general and of East European travels in particular and the accompanying diversification--the most appropriate if unelegant term would be "complexification"--of the strategies, in schemas and resources, used by the migrants. In the following section we take a closer look at the main genres of contemporary international travels and activities of East European migrants as they maneuver "within the limits of the possible" in the pursuit of their purposes, often creating this possible themselves by appropriating, as it were, the openings and loopholes in the economy and civic-political debates, laws, and policies regarding (im)migration.

III. People in Motion: Composite Travels, Flexible Strategies

At the turn of the twentieth century migrations in the Atlantic world system represented basically one "pure" economic type (except for East European Jews whose mass exodus had a combined, economic-political character) of either seasonal or permanent character. Multiple and overlapping criteria which differentiate contemporary migrations: their purposes (work/earning the income, education/ training, family visits/reunions, refuge/asylum from political oppression, entertainment/ tourism), legal status of stay and/or activity in the host country (legal, illegal, awaiting/appealing decision), and duration (shorter- or longer-term temporary, permanent, shuttle), and the "blurred" or compound nature of most actual cross-border travels, preclude the construction of a clear-cut typology of these movents.

Macrostructural processes contributing to this "polymerization" have already been discussed. Robert Merton's concept of the "innovators" from his

classic essay Social Structure and Anomie (1968) serves very well as a general explanation in accord with the structuration model of why East European social actor-migrants "complexify" their international travels. Progressive globalization opens before people's eyes new and more options and possibilities (material possessions, lifestyles, adventure), and new and more ways to pursue them. At the same time, those whose opportunities to realize these promises are constrained by the (semi-)peripheral position of their countries/regions in the structures of the global system and/or by their individual/ class structural location within their countries, and by restrictive policies of admission to the core regions where these possibilities can be best realized are inclined to "play against the system" or to innovate by using other than accepted, also illegitimate, means to achieve the (culturally approved) objectives otherwise unavailable.

Alfred Schutz's (1962) distinction between the "because of" and "in order to" reasons of social phenomena nicely translates into the structuration model as corresponding, respectively, to macro and micro factors in the migration process. Whereas the unequal (inferior) position of Eastern Europe in global and Continental macrostructures and its consequences for that region's economic performance constitute the "because" context of NW-bound travels of its residents, the "in order to" motives of the migrants reflect individual, or, better, shared (with the families and reference groups) needs and schemas regarding the preferred goals and important values. Not suprisingly in view of long- and middle-dure bigger structures that generate present-day East European flows, the economic or work/income related in-order-to purpose of migration has been the common denominator of nearly all compound types of cross-border movements of ECE and EE travelers alike. (Among younger people, however, the motive to explore and learn seems on the increase; and, as they did a century ago, Jews emigrate for a combination of political and economic reasons, the latter meaning a more affluent life and a better future for the children.)[19]

This primary in-order-to motive informing most kinds of international travels of East Europeans has had two major varieties (detectable, for that matter, among turn-of-the-twentieth-century migrants as well):[20] work/income abroad is intended to help the migrants and their families to survive or maintain their existing standards of living or to enable them to improve, more or less radically, their life situations. The prevalence of one or the other in-order-to motive influences migrants' plans and decisions about how far and for how long to go. Studies of recent westbound migrations of East Europeans suggest that the former purpose more commonly (although not exclusively) informs border-region shuttle migrations, and the latter usually guides medium-to-longer duration and longer-distance sojourns. Status mobility (vs. status maintenance) purpose has been, as expected, more common among younger, better-educated, urban migrants than among their sociodemographic opposites. Gender does not seem significantly to differentiate these orientations, but it may be that its effects have not been analyzed systematically enough.[21] The three most common varieties of present-day composite migrations of East Europeans have been: short- (1-4 months) to middle- (up to 12 months) duration sojourns that combine tourism with income earning from "informal" work (wage/salary employment or

trade); the same combined with visiting family or friends; and more or less regular one-to-several-day border-region shuttle migrations for legal or "gray" work and trade and for entertainment. (Easy transportation/communication and lifting of short-stay visa requirements to NW countries for ECE migrants has expanded their concept of border regions; borderland now covers, for instance, the distance between Berlin in Germany and Szczecin and Poznan in Poland, or between Vienna and Prague and Budapest. For East Eastern Europeans, too, border regions have been expanding to signify the space, say, between Lviv and Rzeszow or between Vilno and Bialystok.) Counting "moves" rather than persons since shuttling across the border(s) became the standard mode of international migration, these three major forms of the present-day population movement across and outside Eastern Europe add up to more than 100 million annually. (This figure does not include the much more voluminous ethnic resettlements within the CIS). To these most "populous" forms of migration one may add, declining since the collapse of Soviet Communism but still visible numbers of political-economic migrants whose asylum petitions before or soon after 1989-90 have been either denied or appealed and who, because they are no longer qualified for social assistance from the receiver welfare states, in order to make a living join the army of illegal income-earning tourists or shuttle cross-border traders. (Among ECE migrants in NW countries Poles are the most numerous in this category; EEE asylum seekers in ECE countries have consituted only a fraction of the still small but growing total which comrpises primarily immigrants from Asia).[22]

Although they share with their turn-of-the-twentieth-century predecessors income earning as the main purpose of international migrations, present-day travels of East Europeans differ from the past ones not only in their compound character but also in some other features that reflect specific macro and micro contexts in which they take place. First, most of them are temporary and of a shorter-to-middle rather than long duration. It should be noted here that the majority of turn-of-the-century migrants, including those to the United States, intended their sojourn to be temporary (and between 30% and 40% of them actually returned to their home countries[23]). But present-day travels of East Europeans are temporary. The following factors have contributed to making them so.

In receiving societies restrictive (im)migration controls (including severe limitations on travels to the United States, the traditionally preferred destination of East European migrants) have made permanent and long-duration sojourns if not impossible then difficult and/or risky. And the restructuring of the NW economies has made long-term jobs scarcer and short-term fexible ones easier to find. In sending, particularly ECE, societies, progressive economic and political transformations, however painful for their direct bearers, do offer a promise of improved opportunities in the future--to younger people, anyway, who are the majority of migrants.[24] For East Eastern Europeans, most of whom (except Jews and German Aussiedlers) migrate to the neighboring western countries, the chances of becoming established there permanently are very slim. Last but not least, advances in transportation techonology have greatly facilitated shuttle

travels.

Another new feature of contemporary East European migrations has been a significantly increased presence of women, ranging from 45% to over 70% of the total number of travelers, depending on the locality, especially its socioeconomic profile and dynamic, cultural traditions, and destinations of flows.[25] This development can be explained by a combination of macro and micro factors: the permanent emergence of women from the home into the labor market during the Communist era, and women's related increased autonomy or sense of "can do" in the social-normative as well as pscyhological-attitudinal sense. Importantly, the prevailing temporal character of present-day migrations and easy transportation/communication between home and abroad facilitate women's (in particular wives' and mothers' of underage children) international travels.

Finally, in comparison with turn-of-the-twentieth-century international travelers the educational level of their contemporary successors has been significantly higher with the greatest concentration of migrants in the vocational and secondary schooling category. (East European Jews, in the 1890s distinct from the rest of migrants from that region because of their much higher literacy rates, one century later are again the exception in that a majority of emigrants in this group have had college education[26]). Correspondingly, even though the occupational skills of most migrants do not fit the demands of high-tech economies of the core countries they go to, modern migrants nevertheless possess much more diversified skills than did their predecessors one century ago.

Among indocumentado income-earners, trading migrants on (or overstaying) short-term tourist visas are probably the most numerous group and small traders prevail.[27] They can be divided into so-called ants and jumacze. Border-region peddlers or ants, men and women, who shuttle back-and-forth are bazaar-type marketeers trading in consumer items differently priced on two (sometimes three) sides of the border. The goods are then sold to the wholesalers or, mostly by "ants" from EEE where consumer shortagers, including basic foods, are still very common, traded for goods lacking at the moment at home. The criminal variety of cross-border peddlers, so-called jumacze (a new Polish term for cross-border thieves) operate on a somewhat larger financial scale. These mostly young men steal in bulk better-quality merchandise in host-country department stores, homes, and cars, and move it across the border (this "work" is performed by ECE migrants in neighboring NW countries and by EEE travelers in East Central Europe).[28]

Operating over and above tourist traffic in small items is a big- and bigger-yet regional and intercontinental illegal business involving an army of international envoys, almost exclusively male, who travel under various disguises as tourists, businessmen, and so on, and control thousands of middle-size entrepreneur contrabandists of various kinds. East European migrants (and stationary residents, for that matter), some of them supposedly under control of the so-called Russian Mafia, have been engaged in all levels and fields of such "work," ranging from money laundering, dealings in gold, the wholesale

smuggling of high-tech equipment, cars, alcohol and drugs, to, on the increase in the recent years, people. The latter include paid-for East-West transfers, usually with a stopover in East Central Europe, of volunteer emigrants, mostly Asian, and Frauenhandlung, or soliciting young ECE and EEE women into forced prostitution, primarily in Germany, but also in westernmore Europe and in Middle East.[29]

Worth noting in this context not for its volume, which is much smaller than westbound flows, but because of its reverse direction, has been recent legal-illegal Handeltourismus conducted in East Eastern Europe by Jewish emigres from that region who reside in Germany, and to a lesser degree, in the United States. (Because more than one-third of them are intermarried with non-Jewish Russians and Ukrainians, the phenomenon can be treated as general for EEE (e)migrants rather than specifically ethnic.) This "tourist business" is illegal or "gray" in a double sense because EEE Jews and their families are granted in Germany and the United States the status of political asylants and as such should not visit their home countries as free-traveling tourists and because, according to reports, a good part of the business dealings they conduct falls into the "gray" or "black" sphere of the economy (at the same time, however, these tourist-businessmen mediate the entry into East-Eastern Europe of perfectly legitimate western businesses).[30]

Combining international tourism or visits with family or friends with informal/illegal employment of shorter or longer duration or, as is increasingly common (especially in border regions), repeated subsequent returns, is another very popular form of contemporary East European migrations, by men and women and low- and high-skilled travelers alike. The majority of indocumentado-job-seeking male migrants find employment--most common ECE and EEE occupations are similar--in personal services and small enterpreneurship and in the informal economy; in Germany, interestingly, they are often reported to work for their better-established Italian and Turkish predecessors, whereas in the United States, where ethnic colonies of East Europeans are larger, residentially concentrated, and better organized, for their fellow ethnics. Another common type of work is agriculture and construction where migrants are employed by native (NW) employers who thus save on wages, welfare service deductions, and taxes.[31] Women on tourist visas without work permits most commonly employ themselves in domestic services (as maids and housekeepers, babysitters, caregivers to the elderly), and also as seamstresses or hairdressers; they also work as prostitutes. Greatly increased in numbers in the recent years, especially in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavian countries, and "staffed" by young and middle-aged women from nearly all ECE and EEE countries (migrants from the latter also work in the former), Prostitutiontourismus takes the form of shuttle travels in the border regions. Clearly conducive toward this income-earning activity--working 12 hours per day on "busy" weekends can double an average monthly salary at home--has been 40% to 60% female unemployment along the borders, respectively, of East Central European countries with Poland the Czech Republic, and the Ukraine's and Lithiania's with Poland.[32]

Highly educated East European short- and medium-term visitors or stipend-holders in the West: natural scientists, medical doctors, academics, commonly undertake informal work as well, almost as a rule well beneath their skills, either in service establishments or as laboratory assistants in hospitals and research institutes. They are employed there by native or fellow-ethnic colleagues who have large grants (exploitative by Western standards at $12-$15 per hour, in 1996 the latter occupations earned thus emplloyed ECE migrants eight-to-ten times more in one month than their professional salaries at home). A large number of such professional migrants, especially from East Eastern Europe where the post-1989/90 economic situation in science and academia has been much more dramatic than in westernmore parts of the region, repeatedly extend their stays abroad and work odd jobs, contributing to the "brain drain" from their home countries. And, thus, since 1991 the Russian Academy of Sciences has lost to the brain drain, most likely permanently, more than 25% of its scientists as the result of the radical reduction of state subsidies for research and science. (Before the 1990s the brain drain from Eastern Europe took place primarily as the result of politically motivated emigration; for example, after the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, about 15% of Polish scholars, most frequently computer scientists, physicists, and biologists, either permanently emigrated or left the country for long-term contracts abroad; more than a few of them, and some earlier political emigres from the Czech Republic and Hungary have since returned to their home countries or circulate between their former and present Vaterlands.)[33]

A subvariety of the brain drain, "brain waste" or high-skill migration resulting in occupational skidding, involves particularly high social and personal costs. Unfortunately, only scattered data exist on this phenomenon among contemporary East European professional (e)migrants in NW countries; they suggest that, even in the case of former-Soviet Jews, better institutionally positioned in their countries of emigration (see below), occupational skidding affects the majority of people in this category, regardless of their destination although, as expected, natural and computer scientists (males) less so than representatives of the social science and humanistic professions.[34]

Two more kinds of contemporary East-West migration, one ascending and the other descending, should be noted before we move on the discussion of migrants' strategies. The first one, much smaller in volume than any of the above types, although clearly on the rise since 1989-90 and of great consequence for the region's successful transformation, have been short-to-middle-term "legitimate" professional travels (increasingly both ways, including return visits by emigres) of scientists, business people, production and corporate managers--most of them male--a few of whom have already joined the "global elite"--transnational commuters who do their jobs while shuttling around the world, and educational/training migrations of students. The other, descending kind of international migrants, also predominantly male, are EE contract workers employed in NW countries--a total of some 450.000 in 1996 (and about 100,000 employed in other regions). Since that time, however, as they confront hightened unemployment of their native work force, the receiver core countries have either

announced or already taken steps (e.g., Germany, the main contractor of such labor) to limit this form of migration.[35]

Micro-level structures of everyday life: cultural schemas and social and economic resources that within broader contexts shape the decisions migrants make and actions they pursue should be examined within a comparative-historical perspective of both longer and shorter dure: the sociocultural capital at the disposition of turn-of-the-twentieth century East European travelers, on the one hand, and, on the other, popular outlooks and "coping tools" developed by citizens of state-socialist societies to deal with the user-unfriendly and inefficient Soviet system. The general conclusions from this double comparison are the following.

Like the macrostructures within which they are nested and the composite types of international travels they (co)produce, the orientations and resources of contemporary East European migrants have become differentiated and "complexified." Two important features of the past experiences, however, one from the more remote and the other from more proximate history, have continued to inform by and large contemporary migrants' strategies because of their enduring utility for traveler-citizens of (semi-)peripheral parts of the global system. First, although individual or self-supported international travels of East European migrants have definitely increased, others-dependent migration has remained the predominant pattern. In the Atlantic world economy and in the contemporary world system social networks of information and assistance have played a crucial role in the decisions made by prospective migrants about where and how to travel and, upon arrival, how to organize their sojourns.[36]

Second, in comparison with turn-of-the-twentieth-century East European migrations that relied almost exclusively on informal support networks (except for East European Jews, whose emigration was also helped by social agencies organized by their western coreligionists), institutionally assisted travels of their contemporary successors have clearly increased, the former kind continues to predominate. The endurance of informal support networks--their expansion, actually, into the institutional sphere--has been sustained by the embedded popular schema-cum-practice of "working the system" transferred from experiences during the Communist era and meaning, informed by the basic distrust of the official-institutional structures, the reliance on informal connections and using roundabout or illegitimate means perceived as the best or only way toward one's purposes.[37]

Although the informal-support-based and "beat the system"-oriented strategies appear typical for the pursuits of most contemporary migrants across and out of Eastern Europe, how exactly they are applied varies by the duration and forms of migration, local traditions, and opportunities available abroad. I consider these strategies first in relation to the duration and distance of travel: shuttle/short-term cross-border vs. middle- to longer-term and permanent greater-distance (e)migrations, and next, within the latter, in the premigration stage and after arrival in the host society.

Most of the multimillion-strong shuttle and short-term cross-border migrations of East Europeans have as their purpose trade, and, next in importance, undocumented employment. This flourishing of the entrepreneurial spirit appears surprising in the region where traditionally trade was performed by ethnic minorities (mostly Jews) and was stigmatized as a suspicious and basically dishonorable occupation in the eyes of both major classes, peasants and gentry alike. Subsequently the prolonged Communist rule suppressed and stigmatized it even further as an exploitative capitalist pursuit and cultivated instead, as sociologists have argued, the "homo sovieticus" type of passive receiver of existential provisions furnished by the socialist state. Actually, the homo sovieticus syndrome has contained different situationally activated component-adaptors: where there existed state-socialist provisions (e.g., guanranteed employment and minimal wages), they sustained expectations; where, instead, the state notoriously did not perform (e.g., provision and distribution of consumer goods), inefficiency actually fostered enterepreneurial spirit in the citizenry, forcing it to use whatever means it could to make everyday life possible and making deviant behavior into the social norm. In relation to the topic discussed here, blending tourism with business in Eastern Europe dates back into the early 1970s when Communist welfare state-sponsored international vacation travels inside the Soviet bloc became a mass phenomenon. In an innovative adjustment to Soviet-style shortage economies, intrabloc tourism was used as an opportunity for a huge-scale unofficial, in fact illegal, commercial traffic between the vacationing member nationals of Soviet-bloc countries. (The volume of this exchange was estimated in the 1980s at 25%-30% of the entire COMECON trade.)[38]

To the extent that "playing against the system" was the routine strategy of citizens of the Soviet bloc for coping with the regime of all-pervasive constraints and prohibitions--"pariah entrepreneurship" against the rigidified structures--present-day East European migrants may have particularly good resources (approaches and skills) to "appropriate" for their own purposes the growth of informal economies and loopholes in the immigration policies of NW countries, and ECE as receivers of EEE migrants. As they gain experience in Handeltourismus under new capitalist conditions and (semi-)open borders, migrants develop professional know-how about the particulars and changes of cross-border consumer demand and supply, price differentials, custom regulations, traffic flows at specific border-crossing points, and so on. Less or no longer habituated to Soviet-style behavior, however, younger migrants who become successful in their undertakings, acquire a Western-style, informed rational-risk-taking entrepreneurial orientation as they become partners of rather than mere facilitators for core NW business/corporations.

When a (relatively) small-scale trade is involved, migrants usually travel alone or, if the trip is longer, with a partner or with more family members who help conduct business. But "professional assistance" waits on each side of the border: wholesale trucks or warehouses to deliver or pick up the goods or manufacturing establishments producing merchandise (usually garments) to be taken across the border. Support networks involved in smaller-scale

Handeltourismus tend to represent the informal/institutional blend with the emphasis on the former: personal connections are of primary importance and there is a "hook up" to a legitimate (registered) outfit. Large-scale undertakings, including smuggling of drugs and people across the border, represent a combination of personal trust and the (highly) organized network characteristic of mafia-type operations; informal/organized is probably the most accurate (if oxymoronic) characterization of social assistance relied on in this case. As indicated by the huge volume of international cargo that goes through in this way, bribing of customs officials by smaller- and bigger-scale Handel-migrants may be considered as another effective support strategy-resource of the social kind because it requires cooperation.[39] The "Russian Mafia" and the international movement of people and things it controls provides another illustration of past experience-- connections and capital accumulated under the Communist regime--being effectively turned into current resources. The Mafia, apparently composed largely of the former Soviet nomenklatura, or holders of middle- and higher-level positions in the bureaucractic structure of the Communist system that were reserved for party members, including a strong representation of the military, has loyal personnel well-trained in secretive dealings and substantial capital accumulated during several decades of feudal-style corrupt rule over a large empire.

Shuttle and short-term cross-border migrations for employment rely on a combination of individual and social resources: a migrant's knowledge of specific labor needs in the host country and appropriate skills and--a sine qua non condition of successful travel--personal connections to or with the employer. Because the work performed is gender-specific, these connections are usually gendered as well. They can be provided provided by fellow-nationals in the home country who have migrated for work before, fellow-ethnics in the host country, or, as is increasingly common with the growth of informal economies in the receiving countries, by the native employers themselves who are seeking cheap and dispensable labor. Those employers may then form an informal assistance network on their own as they recommend migrants to friends and acquaintances in need of repairmen, carpenters, babysitters, and so on.[40] Migrants from East Eastern Europe who come to ECE countries for short-term undocumented work--estimates of shuttle and short-term illegal EEE workers in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic combined put their number at 700,000-750,000 in 1996[41]--use similar strategies combined, where entry visas are required, with institutional assistance from specialized travel agencies or arrange for "private invitations." At several checkpoints along Poland's eastern border I observed in the summer of 1997 kiosks selling such documents.

Migrants who plan middle-to-longer duration sojourns or intend permanent relocation abroad prepare for their travel before they leave home. Studies of recent international migrations of East Europeans suggest that the following schemas and resources "structure" this preparatory phase as migrants-to-be make plans, choose the destination, and organize the journey.[42]

The decisions whether to go or stay are, thus, the outcome of the family

economic situation, its needs and prospects as perceived by potential migrants, their knowledge and evaluation of local and more distant domestic opportunities to earn income, the "demonstration effect" of those, especially neigbors, who have traveled abroad before and the accomplishments (or failures) of their purposes, and, last but not least, the migrants' individual predispositions and usable skills and previous migration experience, both personal and of family members. This configuration of factors that generate migration decisions of contemporary East European travelers is basically similar to that of considerations used by their turn-of-the-twentieth-century predecessors to plan international migration. But the underlying "preparadness to move" has been considerably enhanced among the contemporaries by the more advanced and encompassing incorporation of that region and its residents into global system of consumer goods and (especially) their images, and avenues (in this case, migration) to augment one's income and material possessions, and, at the local level, the significantly diminished--although by no means vanished-- power of accustomed outlooks and customs in the immediate social environment over individual views and activities.

Decisions where to migrate are also shaped by multiple considerations, checked-and-balanced against each other. There are popular images, often dating back to the previous century, of particular countries as especially desirable. Two places have been traditionally most valued by East Europeans: America, whose mythos as the fortune-changing "Promised Land" has been unmatched by any other destination worldwide, and Germany, the good place for chodzic na saksy, going to Saxony, in the old Polish idiom for seasonal work in that country to augment family incomes. The generalized representation of "the West," including northwestern Europe and North America as the source of high earnings and easily accessible consumer goods has become even more entrenched in EE societies during the Communist era as the idealized (and idolized) contrast to the existential conditions of Realsocialismus and a way to resist Communist anti-Western propaganda). There are also local or regional traditions of actual migrations some of which were established by turn-of-the-last-century mass population movements that continue to channel present-day flows, for example, travels from the Podhale region in Poland to the United States or from the Bochnia and Wieliczka counties near Cracow to Austria (and also to Hungary). Other localities have established traditional destinations of a more recent provenance, for example, travels to Belgium from northeastern Polish towns dating back to the 1970s.

These preferences and traditions are subject to corrections reflecting the actual opportunities afforded by the (im)migration policies of the contemplated host country first to enter and then to sojourn there as an undocumented worker. From this perspective, the United States, still the "dream destination" of most East European migrants were they given free choice, appears difficult or impossible (although thousands of aspiring Poles, for example, have tried to "organize" through their families and friends in America participation in recent lotteries for permanent residence in that country), whereas Germany, despite its recently tightened immigration controls, is viewed as more accessible and--an

important consideration for temporary or "shuttling permanent" East European migrants--conveniently close. (Ironically in more ways than one, the recent influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union into Germany--about 65,000 since 1989-90--who are admitted as political refugees has been motivated, according to more than two-thirds of immigrants recently investigated in Berlin, by Germany's proximity to Russia and the convenience of back-and-forth travel.[43])

Perhaps the most important corrective to all the above considerations is the presence of the informal (most common), institutional, and mixed-type (also popular) social support networks abroad that potential migrants can rely on when organizing their travel and, later on, during their sojourns. Access to social capital that facilitates migration provides yet another illustration of one of the main premises of this paper, namely, that the past matters for the present, or, in this case, that preestablished social contacts abroad or even the very existence there of a community of fellow nationals/ethnics equip migrants who have such connections with a powerful resource to pursue their purposes. Poles and (East European) Jews, for example, whose national groups participated en masse in turn-of-the-twentieth-century migrations and, after World War II, in the flight to the West (the Hungarians joined in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968), are particularly "rich" in this resource; every third Polish family and every second CIS-Jewish family today reportedly has either family or friends living abroad, and a total of about 18 million members of (non-Jewish) national minorities in the European part of the CIS have family or ethnic ties abroad.[44] According to studies, between 35% and 60%, depending on the locality, of recent ECE migrants preparing their travel abroad had family or friends there who helped them to organize their journeys, and about 40% (average) had support networks that totally or partially covered the costs of their voyages.[45]

(E)migrants from EEE parts of the Continent and highly skilled ECE travelers seem to rely more commonly, although for different reasons depending on nationality and socioeconomic position, on some combination of informal/institutional assistance networks rather than primarily on personal connections. CIS-Jews and German Aussiedlers (also those from ECE countries) are assisted, respectively, by world and country-of-immigration Jewish organizations established for this purpose and by the German government agencies. But both groups reportedly rely also on the support of family and friends arleady in the destination country,[46] while other EEE migrants use the (fake) "private invitations," specialized travel agencies, and direct or indirect contacts with the potential employers in the host countries to arrange for their passages and to secure work in advance. Highly skilled travelers from the entire region often use Western (in addition to or rather than co-ethnic) friends as the facilitators; the jobs they prearrange for their acquaintances range from legitimate (through waivers, exemptions etc., that often require quite a bit of know-how in legal maneuvering on the part of the assisting native) to semilegitimate (such as the already mentioned employment of migrant visitors as laboratory workers or fieldworkers assigned special tasks who are paid from private grants of native researchers).

One more resource used in the pre-migration stage is advance knowledge about the chosen host country. Existing studies suggest an interesting if not entirely surprising phenomenon in view of the social enclosure and inwardness of (im)migrant communities. While personal support networks abroad: family, friends, and former migrants provide more or less adequate information about such obviously important matters as job availability and conditions, wages, available housing and rents, the cost of living, and possibilities for savings, they teach prospective migrants relatively little about broader issues that will affect them directly or indirectly during their stays abroad as temporary migrant undocumented workers, such as the political system and immigration policies, minimal wages, and social provisions for and legal recourses available to (im)migrants.[47] (E)migrants who rely on institutional, especially host-country government agecies, however, such as German Aussiedlers from CIS and ECE countries and their neighbors who themselves travel, for example, migrants from Slask Opolski in southwestern Poland, have been reported to possess more and more ssematic knowledge regarding laws and regulations of the host country they chose.[48]

After they arrive in the host country, unless they are political refugees or ethnic resettlers, the majority of East European migrants who plan a middle-to-longer duration sojourn abroad undertake undocumented work, and--regardless of their legal status--find lodging among their fellow nationals, with contemporary migrants, or in earlier established ethnic communities. The carry-over "beat the system" schema from the Communist era that has informed the pursuits of Handeltourists has been widely applied as well by undocumentado-worker-tourists. In combination with the resource of social connections from (alternately or cumulatively) family, friends, fellow-nationals/ethnics, neighbors and/or employers from longer- and better-established immigrant/ethnic groups and/or friendly or interest-motivated natives, it has been quite effective in facilitating the realization of migrants' major purpose abroad, that is, to earn income, the more of it the better. Willingness to work very hard at these undocumented activities--illegal worker migrants from Eastern Europe, men and women, have been reported by the media in their host countries to labor "docilely" for 12-14 hours a day in conditions no native worker would tolerate--has been, of course, a personal resource without which social-capital facilitators would have had no effect. A resource, too, likewise commented on by mainstream media, has been migrants' readiness to share the inconveniences of overcrowded, often substandard quarters with fellow-nationals (a personal-social strategy), and to save drastically on food in order to lower the costs of living and to increase savings, up to 70% of average monthly wages, according to studies. (A similar wages-to-savings ratio, and similar half-admiring, half-resentful reports by native observers about East European migrants' "low standards" and stamina were also common, for that matter, one century ago[49]).

Although the instrumental role of support networks of fellow nationals or fellow ethnics for the success of migrants' purposes during their sojourns abroad cannot be exaggerated, these social connections perform also an important expressive function by providing the familiar milieu (also for contract workers

who do have secure jobs): in a bar or cafe, in an ethnic store, at a church picnic on Sunday, while reading the local paper in their native language or listening to radio programs, in which migrants can feel at home and share common interests. Co-national/ethnic participation for instrumental and expressive purposes had played a similarly significant function for turn-of-the-twentieth-century East European (im)migrants. One striking difference between the ways of this in-group involvement abroad of turn-of-the-century and contemporary migrants can be ascribed to the specific experience of the latter which has had an enduring impact on their orientations. As noted by several observers of contemporary (im)migrant colonies, recent East European migrants have been reluctant to organize themselves. Whereas it may be an understandable caution among undocumented worker-migrants who prefer to keep a low profile in western Europe as well as in the United States for fear of being deported (although Hispanic indocumentados in the American southwest, supported by the official Hispanic-American associations, are quite visible and vocal), this reluctant attitude among EE migrants seems much less comprehensible in the case of their fellow nationals with legal status, and remains in sharp contrast to their turn-of-the-twentieth-century predecessors who founded multiple associations wherever they settled.

This dislike for civic involvement reflects the ingrained, lasting mistrust of state and, generally, "official" organizations that is characteristic of citizens of Soviet-dominated East European societies --the attitude which Kenneth Jowitt (1992) has called "dissimulation" or the retraction of people from the official sphere that meant mostly trouble to them into their private circles. As studies of the practices of certain (im)migrant groups suggest, however, this orientation, like the "homo sovieticus" syndrome of which it is part, is more complex than just a retreat from the institutional sphere. Although they are reluctant to organize their associations, present-day East European migrants seem eager to and actually do use existing organizations, ethnic and, if they are entitled, host government's agencies, that come forward with assistance, while forging informal connections therein. Ironically again, it is (post-)Soviet Jewish (im)migrants in Germany and the United States, the descendants of the people who stood as the model, ambivalent as it was, of modern capitalist entreprenuership in the popular consciousness of their East European neighbors, who provide perhaps the best illustration of this homo-sovieticus approach of "take what they give but don't involve yourself." As so-called contingent asylants, CIS-Jewish immigrants in Germany are provided, in addition to the assistance from German-Jewish agencies, with a set of social benefits from the German welfare system, ranging from subsidized food and housing, monthly financial allowances, medical assistance, and child care to language instruction and occupational (re)training. (According to a recent study in Berlin, three years after their arrival from the NIS about 40% of Jewish families still received social welfare assistance, and nearly 70% did not join any ethnic organizations.)[50] Because the assignments they get (e.g., housing, schools for children) are not always to their liking, they help themselves, so to speak, by ingratiating themselves to lower-level German officials by offering little gifts and establishing "personal connections," expecting in exchange--and often actually obtaining--assistance in matters that

concern them.[51]

Whereas dealing with public agencies, whether in the straightforward manner or Soviet-style, generally improves legal (im)migrants' chances of realizing their purposes, avoiding these institutions, although understandable in the case of indocumentados, may actually be detrimental to them to the extent that by avoiding engagement with any such groups and organizations, migrants miss also those that make it their business to assist foreigners in exactly their situations by providing civil rights lawyers to prevent explusion or to find information about rights due the employees, including undocumented ones. The Polnischer Sozialrat, Polish Social Council, in Berlin has recently established, funded by the local Green Party and SDP, regular social counseling for illegal migrants to enhance their insecure position. The bureau's clientele has been on the increase since the day it opened.[52]

Another resource relied on by migrants as they pursue their goals, a strategy increasingly popular as the result of the growing interconnectedness of different regions of the world through easy transportation and, for East Central Europeans and some of their eastern neighbors, the opening of core states' borders for short-time visitors from semiperipheries, has been "situational shuttling" between the receiver and home country. When there is momentarily no employment, or when there have been police rides on the neighborhoods known to house illegal (over)stayers of visas, or when they are needed at home for some reason, migrants return and come back again later. Some illegal Ukrainian workers in southeastern Poland have been reported to return home near Lviv, one at a time, every ten days or so to buy much cheaper food there for the whole group and then to go back to work.[53]

East European migrants' strategies abroad include as well the use of personal capital or self-reliance derived from qualifications and competence and the support of what Mark Granovetter (1985) has called "weak social ties" located primarily in the occupational environment of migrants and used to enhance rather than replace personal skills. (The other type is "strong" kinshiplike bonds). Admitting to a wishful thinking, I call this a "harbinger strategy."[54] It is the outcome not only of personal characteristics of the individuals but of the interplay between those features and the social situations people find themselves in. It is, therefore, predictably more common among highly educated migrants with skills corresponding to the needs of a postindustrial economy, who are employed in the formal sectors, have legal status in the host country, and who as residents of and workers in that country are viewed as equals by their native neighbors and colleagues. For example, two groups of Poles in Berlin, composed primarily of [e]migrants from the 1980s and some more recent arrivals organized their own professional organizations of Polish business people and Polish medical doctors; they each hold formal meetings a few times each year to exchange information on occupation-related issues and [businessmen] to discuss possibilities of joint ventures, and they also organize cultural events, including trips to Poland to a theater or to a symphony concert. Members of both associations at the same time participate in mainstream

professional organizations.[55]

By way of concluding the discussion of migrants' strategies in pursuit of the purposes that move them across borders, we take a quick look at the effects of these efforts at home: on the standard of living of migrants' families, the welfare of their localities, and the more systemic changes in their countries' economies. In a generally shared opinion historians of turn-of-the-twentieth-century international migrations of East Europeans view the savings and consumer goods brought home from sojourns as critically important to subsidizing the daily existence of individual households or, at best, when larger amounts were acquired from successful, longer work abroad, to elevating their socioeconomic status through the accumulation of material possessions. Those ventures into the world, however, had not become a foundation for self-sustained capitalist transformation of the structure of migrants' (semi-)peripheral home societies, but had repaired it somewhat at the base without changing the system. Is it different today?

It is, of course, impossible to draw any solid conclusions about the impact of recent international migrations of East Europeans on their home countries from observations based on the short period under consideration here, less than one decade. Social survey and ethnographic reports suggest, however, that the primary effects of migrations, specifically monies earned abroad by international travelers, have been, like those of one century earlier, on the individual households in terms of material consumption: first--and this order reversed in comparison with the Atlantic world system migrations of East Central Europeans--the improvement of family living standards through the acquisition of more and better consumer items (homes, cars, tele-electronics, household furnishings, clothing), and, second, the maintenance of the level of existence threatened by the region's structural transformations. The use of foreign savings by households of EEE migrants, however, has thusfar retained the historical pattern: primarily toward the maintenance, and less often toward the elevation of the living standards.

With few exceptions, investments either in the economic (founding of enterprises, purchase of land/production tools, or stock market shares) or human (educational/ occupational training) capital have had a low priority among the returnees. And although the localities with high volumes of international migration have been reported to have visibly "improved" as people and their habitats acquired more affluent, Westernlike, outlooks, this effect seems to reflect what Ewa Jazwinska and Marek Okolski (1995) called "[status] corrective actions" by a large number of individuals/families who migrate to earn money in order to catch up with others who have already been out, returned, and display their elevated positions, rather than the transformation of the local socioeconomic structure.[56]

It is, indeed, much too early even to consider macrostructural, systemic consequences of recent international migrations on Eastern Europe. One can note the potential effects of still-limited but growing participation of

migrants/returnees in large-scale joint (NW-E) economic ventures and the gradual, low-level but, nevertheless, professionalization of interstate trade conducted by Handelmigrants, neither of which took place at the turn-of-the century period of the region's accelerated urbanization-industrialization. What may be of a greater, more general significance for the transformative potential (not yet reality) of contemporary migrations for East European socioeconomic structures is that in comparison with that earlier period the transformations "move down" from the top, as it were (in political programs, anyway), opening new spaces for action at the local level into which, once they acquire permanence and the trust of the local residents, migrants' capital and energies can move. It is, however, the postindustrial phase of capitalism that Eastern Europe is trying to catch up to, of capitalism based on flexible work and the informal economy--the conditions, I suggested earlier, into which Soviet-style "innovative" orientation, as international migrants' strategies indicate, is particularly adaptible. It would be a perverse joke of history indeed were this orientation, rather than gradually disappear, come back "from the bottom up" as a capitalist strategy, with a helping hand from the international migrants who have perfected it, as it were, in the mouth of a Western lion.

IV. Transnational Lives, Creole Identities

As the social scientists' interest in globalization expanded beyond economy-centered discussions into the spheres of politics and culture, the implications of the densified transnational connections binding different parts of the world for the concepts and practice of modern nation-state and citizenship have become the subject of intense scholarly debates, also among (im)migration specialists. The latter have focused their dicussion on the mechanisms and consequences of (im)migrants' transnationalism understood as either one or a combination of three phenomemena: holding of multiple citizenships, civic-political involvement in several nation-states, and either plural national identity or the assumption of postnational, global identification (see, e.g., Cornelius et al. 1994; Soysal 1994; Brubaker 1996; Freeman 1995; Kearney 1995; Jacobson 1996; Guttierez 1997; Joppke 1997; Glick-Schiller et al. 1995; Baubock 1995; Verdery 1994).

In these discussions contemporary (im)migrants' transnationalism has been usually represented as a recent phenomenon and has been considered almost exclusively in the political-institutional context. Using turn-of-the-twentieth-century and contemporary East European migrations as an illustration, I argue, first, that transnational commitments and identities had already been common among migrants one century ago but that the circumstances in which these past and present transnationalisms functioned and, therefore, their effects have been different. Second, I interpret migrants' transnationalism within the framework of the more encompassing structuration model. Third, I comment on the impact of present-day migrants' transnationalism on the nation-states and citizenship in post-Communist Eastern Europe. Because the issue and consequences of transnationalism have thus far not really attracted the attention of students of contemporary East European migrants,[37] the following discussion is based

primarily on the general sociological material on post-1989/90 East European societies, politics, and culture, and on my own research-in-progress on the Weltanschauungen of contemporary East European (e)migrants to Germany and the United States as compared with the lifeworlds of turn-of-the-twentieth-century travelers from that region to these two receiver countries.

Turn-of-the-century (im)migrants had been "transnationals" on several accounts, and those who settled in distant America serve as a good example. First, as already noted in a different context, the majority intended their migration as temporary, and a considerable proportion of them had actually either returned to or made repeated visits to the home country. Second, because of the perception of their sojourn abroad as temporary--the purpose that many of them had maintained throughout the interwar period--most (im)migrants had maintained close economic and social support networks with their home villages/towns in Europe.

Third, the variety of sociocultural agencies created by (im)migrants between the 1880s and the 1910s to assist them as they confronted the new environment played an important role in defining ethnic group boundaries and fostering solidarity by propagating identification with and commitment to the old-country homeland. Turn-of-the-century peasant-(im)migrants from Eastern Europe (still waist-deep in feudal leavings) came to America without a modern "national identity" in the sense of the ideological Vaterland or the imagined community of the eccompassing Patria as distinct from Heimat, the local homeland.[58] (Jews, who brought with them their "mobile" spiritual community of klal-Yisroel that stretched back sixty centuries, were again the exception.) It was only after they came to America and went about creating organized immigrant networks for assistance and self-expression and establishing group boundaries as they encountered an ethnically pluralistic and often hostile environment, that these (im)migrants developed translocal national identities and civic-political commitments as Poles, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, and so on. Lithuaninas have referred to the United States as "the second birthplace of the[ir] nationality," and the same may be said of the others as well.[59] Fourth, as their transatlantic sojourn extended in time, immigrants had naturally developed local, American attachments and interests and assumed hybrid national identities as Hungarian-American, Lithuanian-American, Polish-American, and so on. Still--and fifth--by the 1930s no more than 35%-40% of East European immigrants (excepting Jews of whom it was the majority), by then long-time residents of their new country, had become naturalized in the United States, even those who had maintained intense interest in both personal and public matters in their old homelands.[60]

What makes transnationalism (civic-political and identificational) of contemporary East Central European migrants distinct from that of their turn-of-the-century predecessors (see below on the specific situation of East Eastern Europeans) is that these enduring conditions, in particular (1), (2) and, modified, (4) interact with new developments, which results in a qualitatively different situation. I view the following "added components," some of them inclusive and others exclusive or divisive, as the most important.

At the macro-level there are: (1) accelerated globalization, and, specifically, the penetration through the global media of cultural values and orientations of the world's (NW) core into (NW) into (semi-)peripheral societies, on the one hand, and, on the other, the "compression of time and space" resulting from the transportation-and-communication revolution that makes frequent back-and-forth international travels and maintenance of close translocal contacts significantly easier than one century ago; (2) the politicization of international migration that has created in NW receiver countries a growing army of marginalized "illegal" migrants; (3) the restructuring of the core NW economies, which has created a growing "third" (informal) sector, largely isolated from mainstream advancement/integration opportunities, in which SE migrants disproportionately concentrate, and, equally international, the highly skilled professional-service sector; and (4) the proliferation across the globe and trickle down to the national-level civic-political movements and organizations of laws and declarations upholding universal human rights, civic entitlements of groups and individuals, social justice, and democratic representation and pluralism. Although the practice of a "just pluralism" does not embrace equally all communities (especially those of nonwhites who constitute a large proportion of contemporary SE-NW [im]migrants), these laws and public discourse create institutional channels and a juridico-political climate for groups and individuals either to pursue their grievances or to remain "other" without fear of opprobrium and accusations of state-national disloyalty.

At the micro-level there are: (1) pre-migration Westernization, that is, familiarity and often identification with Western values and lifestyles by potential migrants in their home countries under the impact of the media and contacts with emigre and returnee family and friends; (2) the mostly temporary character of actual international migrations; (3) their geographically closer home destinations (NW European countries) as the result of the restrictions of immigration to the United States; and (4) increasingly common among legal migrants and usually tacitly tolerated by the sender and the receiver governments, the holding of dual (or more) citizenships in the countries of origin and (e)migration. In this ([1]-[4]) situation and as the result of easy international travel and communication, migrants's lives: their homes, work, incomes, friends, and entertainment actually (not only symbolically) "happen" in-between, here and there on two (or more) sides of states' borders. In their recent study of several migrant communities in Poland, Jazwinska and Okolski (1995) called such a translocal sociocultural environment a "pendel society."

In the context of the above circumstances, the meanings (or feelings) and practice of transnationalism of contemporary migrants seem different from the experience of their turn-of-the-twentieth-century predecessors. Put in terms of contemporary debates on "new transnationalism," the option of the third space, available to contemporary migrants, did not exist for their predecessors, who had to accommodate within the multinational space. To use once again the example of East Europeans in America, their transnationalism, that is, interest and involvement in their home countries was confronted with the then pervasive suspicion of foreigners' anti-Americanism and wide support among the natives

for President Woodrow Wilson's renowned "infallible test" for proper hyphenated Americans (who might retain "ancient affections" but their "hearts and thoughts [must be] centered nowhere but in the emotions and the purposes and the policies of the U.S.A.").[61] In this situation the transnationalism of East Europeans (especially the American-born generation in the prewar era) who were perceived by the dominant groups as "ignorant [and] clannish...suspicious aliens of inferior species,"[62] and "tested" by the requirements of the host national citizenship but not supported by the "legitimate" today and more common among contemporary (im)migrants' sense of civic and/or "multicultural" entitlement and the possibility of "retreating" into the informal economic sector for a livelihood was quite problematic and often psychically uncomfortable.

Whereas turn-of-the-century "closet transnationalists" experienced their condition more as a predicament to cope with and resolve with minimum exposure to the accusation of national betrayal in their own minds and hearts and in the eyes of representatives of the two nation-states of which they felt members, today (im)migrants' transnational involvements and identities, including those in the civic-political sphere on the part of both legal as well as illegal migrants, have become to them a matter-of-fact condition or choice (not without tensions, of course) to which they feel entitled.[63] Put differently, the difference in the situations of past and present (im)migrants is that whereas the former were subject to incompatible demands from home and host nation-states and were unprotected by legal-institutional and civic tolerance for the practice of diversity, options are available to the latter in terms of identities and participation, ranging from global to transnational, national, and local and different combinations thereof.

"Composite identities" are, I believe, like composite forms of migration, the most common variety among contemporary (im)migrants, reflecting the multiple structures in which their bearers participate. The composition of the elements making up those identities is situational, shifting, kaleidoscopelike, with the actor's concrete circumstances: a Hungarian residing in Austria, for example, may feel Austrian-Hungarian and, perhaps, an European-to-be while lunching with his friends in a Viennese MacDonald's, and view himself as a native of Budapest while in the company of his Hungarian fellow migrants from different parts of his native country; back in Hungary, the same person, noticing certain differences in his habits or opinions while on an outing with local friends (perhaps to a Latino rock concert in a Budapest discotheque), may consider himself a Hungarian-Austrian and an European. Ulf Hannerz's (1992) concept of "creolization," or mixing, grasps very well the multifaceted and malleable identities of contemporary transmigrants who live in several societies simultaneously and engage in multiple webs of social relations. It is also compatible with the basic premise of "flexible reciprocity" that informs the structuration model proposed here as the conceptual framework to account for international migrations.[64]

The foregoing discussion of macro- and micro-level conditions contributing to translocal involvement of contemporary (im)migrants and of their

composite or "creole" identities applies primarily to ECE travelers whose nation-states, albeit not independent during the Communist era, had, nevertheless, retained autonomy in some important matters, including national consciousness of their citizens whose societies have been incorporated more and more thoroughly into the orbit of Western culture than have the countries in easternmore parts of the Continent. (E)migrants from Eastern East Europe find themselves in a situation that more resembles what has been described as characteristic of turn-of-the-century, difficult-to-reconcile hybrid national consciousness, either because their home countries (Lithuania, Byelarus, Ukraine) are in the process of nation-building requiring undivided loyalty from their citizens or (Russia) are confronted with hightened resentment or open rebellion from long-oppressed national/ethnic groups. (Jewish and German ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union, and perhaps the German minority in Poland are exceptions to the extent that their [e]migrants' identities display a "creole": Jewish [or German]/Russian [Ukrainian, Lithuanian]/country-of-emigration blend.[65] What may be happening, however, and already does happen in some places as the result of present-day EEE migrants' intense back-and-forth travels to the neighboring ECE countries and of the less-voluminous but not unfrequent eastbound journeys by ECE migrants is the reappearance of once strong borderland and/or more extensive, cross-border regional bonds and identities suppressed under Soviet Communist rule--a move "down" from state-national identities rather than (or parallel as it may be) "upward" above them to global commitments.

Scholary discussions of the impact of contemporary migrants' transnational identities and of the emergent "pendel society" in general on the traditional concepts of citizenship and nation-state that inform legal and political processes in modern states have focused almost exclusively on these effects in NW receiver countries. I am interested here in East Central European societies primarily as senders but also as the emergent receivers of international migrants. East Eastern Europe faces at the present moment not postnational dilemmas, but the turmoils of nation-building and national/ethnic conflicts over state territories and membership.

In the current debate among social scientists about the effects of globalization processes, including mass relocations across statal borders and transnationalization of the once territorially bound identities, on the understandings, laws, and policies of the nation-state and citizenship I share the theoretical position of those who view the nation-state as "changing and diversifying, but not dying" (Mann 1993; see also Brubaker 1996; Joppke 1997; Rex 1996; Morawska 1997). Regarding post-1989/90 ECE societies, my thesis is that whereas even a cursory observation of their political affairs reveals the enduring, even enhanced, vitality in the public discourse, also among national diasporas abroad, of the traditionally conceived ideas of nationhood, nation-state, and citizenship, nevertheless a new space has appeared in this discourse for different conceptualizations of this problematic. Although it has thus far been visited mainly in ad hoc excursa, by lawyers, politicians, and organized interest groups, this new space is ready for "domestication."

Public discourse on nation and nationalism in this part of the Continent has been traditionally predominantly "primordial," based on clear-cut us/them distinctions and endowed with strong social sanctions for group boundary crossing. The citizenship laws have reflected these understandings. In these representations emigres and national/ethnic communities abroad have been viewed as diasporas or the extensions, as it were, of the national body into different parts of the world, and members of these diasporas have been expected to share national myths and collective loyalties. Since the collapse of Soviet Communism, these accustomed images and ideologies have been revived and brought into the public forum by organized groups and political parties as schema-resources in the struggle for power, and the publics have been appealed to for support (some of which they have offered, in Poland and Hungary, in their generationally older and earlier established immigrant communities abroad, more than in the Czech Republic and its world diaspora).

At the same time, however, there have institutionalized since 1989-90, in the civic-political life of these countries, specifically in the legislative-juridicial sphere and in the media, vocal organized advocates of open, pluralistic positions and policies regarding inter- and intranational membership and rights, individual as well as group. (The pending inclusion of ECE countries into the European Community strengthens these voices although it may also fuel a counterattack by nationalist-particularist forces.) These groups and parties hold universal civil rights and the individual freedom to choose as the fundaments of the liberal-democratic nation-state, and these principles have informed post-1989/90 political orders in these countries. Such principles also create a legitimate cultural space for transnationalism and other state cross-border identity configurations and for international (and, for that matter, domestic) diasporas whose loyalties and commitments are "left to their own devices." Although citizenship laws continue to be based on the traditional either/or national-territorial criteria, when (common nowadays) multiple citizenships of their own (but not EEE) migrant nationals are concerned, the authorities of East Central European countries do not intervene.

Unlike routine by now discussions about the mechanisms and consequences of ECE's economic incorporation into the world-capitalist system and the emerging global-capitalist elite in that region, the public debate about transnational or otherwise unmoored from their territorial-statal base civic-political identities associated with these processes and with the increased flow of international migration into and out of ECE countries has barely begun there. It has been sporadic and related to particular problems (e.g., the reviving of regional Central Europea as a "cultural community," or the demands for binational rights by German minorities in Poland and the Czech Republic and by the Hungarians in Slovakia) but has not thus far addressed the issue of mass cross-statal migrations and transnational identities and commitments as a permenent societal condition and attempted to find the language for cultural representations, laws, and policies that would reflect polyvalence and flexibility of these very phenomena. As I argued above, the space for such a debate is there, and it is likely to begin soon, as the inclusion of East Central European countries

into the European Union approaches and concretizes into specific legal and policy issues. One would like to hope that the reresentatives of the pendel societies, (e)migrants on all sides of the borders, will be invited to participate in this conversation.

Conclusion

I have proposed the structuration model as recently reformulated by William Sewell for the conceptualization of international migrations, arguing that its capacity to link macro- and micro-level social phenomena while keeping the latter and their relationship underdeterminate and contingent on the specific conditions offers a particularly fitting theoretical framework to account for complex processes of international migrations. I have also argued for the benefits of a historical approach to international migrations, that is, a consideration of longer-dure processes and past events as potentially consequential for present situations. I have then applied the "historicized" structuration model to recent transnational migrations of East Europeans.

Starting, then, with the forces at the upper levels of what Fernand Braudel (1981) called the multistoried structures: the top levels of the operation of world-capitalism, international politics, and global culture traversing the earth in "seven-league boots" and the intermediate levels of the sending (EE) and receiving (NW) countries' socioeconomic structures and immigration policies whose configurations delineate the boundaries of the possible and the impossible within which migrants move, we have moved to the ground-level local "structures of everyday life" in which East European travelers define their purposes, make decisions, and undertake actions.

Within this multistoried framework and against the comparative background of the economic and political contexts and social characteristics of turn-of-the-twentieth-century mass migrations of East Europeans, I have discussed the main forms of international travels of their contemporary successors and shown the igenuous ways they use to "playing the system" as they pursue their goals. Then, before concluding, we have ascended again to the upper-level structures to consider the impact of these international travels and, specifically, of the capital migrants bring and the "composite," translocal identities they develop in their home countries in East Europe. I have suggested that while the capital migrants bring to that region has thus far been used toward the improvement of the standard of living of individual households rather than the larger-scale economic transformation of the provinces or countries of which these households are part, structural opportunities have nevertheless appeared and competent social actors to try to "translate" this amelioration from micro to higher economic levels, at least in the westernmost countries of the region. I have also suggested that even though recent back-and-forth flows of East European migrants across statal borders have not yet evoked a public debate that would challenge accustomed meanings and policies of national identity and citizenship, a space has appeared for such a conversation, which is likely to begin soon.

The main purpose of the paper has been the demonstration of the epistemic gains from applying the structuration model and a historical perspective to international migrations. I am aware that my examination of the "test case," East European travels has not paid sufficient attention to its complexities. (Underanalyzed, for instance, have been between-country differences and sociodemographic effects in the mechanisms and consequences of these migrations.) I believe, however, that because of the theoretical premises that inform it and, especially, its sensitivity to diversity and contingence in social life, the interpretative approach demonstrated here provides good methodological tools to proceed with further, more incisive and differentiating analyses so that, as studies progress and accumulate, our knowledge of these complexities will continue to grow.

Endnotes

1. For cogent and well-informed critical overviews of different conceptualizations of globalism and world-system(s), see, for example, Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation. Structures of the World-Economy*, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1989; and Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (eds.) *Conceptualizing Global History*, Boulder, Co, Westview Press, 1993. On migration in the global framework, see Mary Kritz et al., *Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements*, New York, The Center for Migration Studies, 1983, and Masey Koitz and Hania Zlotnik (eds.) *International Migration Systems: A Global Approach*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992; Wayne Cornelius et al., eds. *Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994.

2.It is particularly the social scientists, and sociologists perhaps more than others, who treat globalization as a post-World War II phenomenon, and, in the explicit or implicit assumption, as linear and irreversible. On the much older roots of this process, and its inherent historical contingency, see Raymond Grew, "On the Prospect of Global History", in Mazlish and Buultjens, *Conceptualizing Global History*, pp. 227-250.

3. In their recent essay reviewing current migration theories, Douglas Massey et al. identify macro and micro varieties of the neo-classical (functional) model: the former focuses on flows of human capital flows generated by wage differentials between the sending and the receiving countries/regions, whereas the latter concentrates on individual decisions to change location based on the knowledge of differences in employment and earnings (D. Massey et al., "Migration Theory, Ethnic Mobilization and Globalization", in M. Guibernau and J. Rex (eds.), *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration*, Polity Press 1997, pp.257-268; see also Massey et al., "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal", *Population and Development Review*, 3, 1993, pp. 431-66).

4. Giddens's notion of structuration, also called the "duality of structure" refers to his proposition of reciprocity between "the media and the outcomes of the practices [or human actions] which constitute social systems" (Giddens 1981: 27).

5. The schemas operate at different levels. The most fundamental, deeply embedded orientations shaped by past history of social actors as encoded in their collective memory as members of national, religious, class, gender, generational, and family groups and by shared life situations are, to use Hans Kohut's apt term, experience-near, or unreflexively held. They include such schemas as unreflexive assumptions-metaphors about the human purpose (achievement, contemplation) in life; confidence (or lack thereof) in a fundamental life promoting force within the universe that can be construed as grounding the basically optimistic (or pessimistic) world philosophy; associative (inside/similar) and dissociative (outside/different) affect-laden Gestalten for ordering the natural and social environment.

The intermediate, semiconscious level schemas include a sense of control over one's destiny or fatalism and the resulting orientation to action, the accustomed individualist or collectivist strategies in pursuing life purposes, body language and emotional expressions, moral and aesthetic conventions. Informed by these underlying orientations but activated by everyday situations, the conscious, close-to-the-surface schemas define the range of currently worthwile pursuits and provide prescriptions for pending action.

6. Sewell actually specifies five "key axioms" of structural change (idem, 16-19). I collapsed them into three by combining the multiplicity and the intersection of structures, and the polysemy and the unpredictability of resources, each twosome operating, I believe, in a basically similar way in facilitating transformation.

7. On turn-of-the-century expansion of industrial capitalism and the developmental inequalities

between the incorporated regions, see Alexander Gerschenkorn, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962; Sidney Pollard, "Industrialization and the European Economy", *The Economic History Review* (2nd series), 26 (1973), pp. 636-49; Clive Trebilcock, *The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780-1914*, New York, Longman, 1981; Ivan Berend and Gyorgi Ranki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1974; and idem, *The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; Boris F. Brandt, *Innostrannye kapitaly, ikh vlijanye na ekonomicheskoye razvite stravy*. St.Petersburg, V. Kirpbayma, 1901, 2 vols.

8. Estimations of the total volume of longer-distance migrations within and outside Eastern Europe between 1870 and 1914 differ quite considerably, because of different methods used by the recording agencies (state, transport, employment) in various countries, and because not all migratory movements were recorded. The range quoted here, the total of 30-40 million "moves", including intra- and intercontinental travels, seems to us most convincing. Information and estimates concerning East European migrations in the considered here period can be found in Imre Ferenczi and Walter Willcox, *International Migrations*, Geneva, International Labor Office, 1929, 2 vols; *Les migrations internationales de la fin du XVIII siècle à nos jours*, Paris, CNRS, 1980; Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte der Auslanderbeschaftigung in Deutschland 1880-1980. Saisonarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter*, Berlin, Dietz, 1986; J.D.Gould, "European Inter-Continental Emigration 1815-1914: Patterns and Causes", *The Journal of European Economic History*, 8(1979), pp.593-980, and *idem*, "European Inter-Continental Emigration: The Role of 'Diffusion' and Feedback", *Journal of European Economic History*, 9(1980), pp.41-112; Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, Pt. 4, "Migration in an Age of Urbanization and Industrialization"; Walter Nugent, *Crossings. The Great Transatlantic Migrations, 1870-1914*, Bloomington, In, Indiana University Press, 1992; Dirk Hoerder and Lesie Page Moch (eds.) *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives*, Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1996. On eastbound migration of Russian peasants see V.Obolensky-Ossinsky, "Emigration from and Immigration to Russia", in Ferenczi and Willcox, *International Migrations*, II, pp.523-567. Both these estimates, it should be noted, still undercount the actual movements during the period considered here: omitted are traditional short-distance labor migrations, which, even if diminished in frequency relative to more remote destinations, were by no means eliminated.

9. Data compiled from Ferenczi and Willcox, *International Migrations*, I, pp.167-186; 384-389; II, pp.219-230, 387; Nugent, *Crossings*, p.15; Moch, *Moving Europeans*, chap.4; Jacob Lestchinsky, "Economic and Social Development of American Jewry", *Past and Present*, New York, Jewish Encyclopaedic Handbook, 1955), v.4, pp.82-93; Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers. East European Jews in Imperial Germany*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1987; Klaus Bade, *Deutsche im Ausland--Fremde in Deutschland. Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Munchen, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992, chap.5. Proportions of laborers among (non-Slavic) Hungarian and Lithuanian (im)migrants in the United States at the beginning of the century were similar to that for the Slavs.

10. The global and East European figures have been estimated from data found in Aaron Segal, *An Atlas of International Migration*, London, Hans Zell Publishers, 1993, pp. 20-25, 40, 56-62, 72; Anthony King, "European International Migration 1945-1990: A Statistical and Geographical Overview", in Russell King (ed.) *Mass Migrations in Europe. The Legacy and the Future*, London, Belhaven Press, 1993, pp. 19-39; Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, New York, Macmillan

1993, chap.6; Bernhard Santel, *Migration in und nach Europa*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1995, pp.113-23; *Trends in International Migration*, Paris, OECD/SOPEMI, Annual Report, 1995, pp. 131-145; Heinz Fassman and Rainer Munz, "La Migration d'Est en Ouest en Europe, 1918-1993" *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, v.11, 3 (1995), pp.43-66; Solon Ardittis (ed.) *The Politics of East-West Migration*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1994--includes essays on Poland by Marek Okolski (pp.51-67); the Baltic states by Luule Sakkeus (pp. 68-85); Hungary by Mary Redei (pp.86-97); the former Czechoslovakia by Zdenek Pavlik and Jarmilla Maresova (pp.111-125); and Russia and the CIS by Valentina Bodrova and Tatjana Regent (pp. 98-110); Hedwig Rudolph, "Die Dynamik der Einwanderung im Nichteinwanderungsland Deutschland", in Heinz Fassman and Rainer Munz (eds.) *Migration in Europa*, Frankfurt and New York, Campus Verlag, 1994, pp.161-182; Piotr Korcelli, "Die polnische Auswanderung seit 1945", ibid., pp. 245-63; Zoltan Dovenyi and Gabriella Vukovich, "Ungarn and die internationale Migration", ibid., pp.263-84; Anatoli Vishnevsky und Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, "Auswanderung as der fruheren Sowjetunion und den GUS-Staaten", ibid., 365-390; *Tourism to the Year 2000. Qualitative Aspects Affecting Global Growth*, Geneva, World Tourism Organization, 1991, 1991, p.27; *Tourism Development Report*, Geneva, World Tourism Organization, 1995, pp.386-401; "Central and Eastern Europe: The Twin Specters of Mass Unwanted Migration and Mass Involuntary Migration", special issue of the *International Migration Review*, XXVI, 2 (1992); Elliott Robert Barkan, *And Still They Come. Immigrants and American Society 1920 to the 1990s*, Wheeling, Ill., Harlan Davidson, 1996, chap.9; Bade, *Deutsche im Ausland--Fremde in Deutschland*, chap.5; current press and OECD reports on international migration.

11. See Christian Dornis, "Migration von und nach Russland seit Mitte der 80er Jahre", in Fassman and Munz, *Migration in Europa*, pp.323-365; Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya, "Auswanderung as der fruheren Sowiejtunion"; Paul Kolsto, "The New Russian Diaspora: Minority Protection in the Soviet Successor States", *Journal of Peace Research*, v.30, 2 (1993), pp.197-217; Lilia Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", *International Migration Review*, v. XXVI, 2(1992), pp.241-257; Tanya Basok and Robert Brym (eds.) *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Resettlement in the 1990s*, Toronto, York Lanes Press, 1991; Oleg Shamshur, "Ukraine in the Context of New European Migrations", ibid, pp.258-268; Valentina Bodrova and Tatjana Regent, "Russia and the CIS", in Ardittis, *The Politics of East-West Migration*; Audra Sipaviciene et al., *International Migration in Lithuania: Causes and Consequences*, Report to the UN Economic Commission for Europe, 1995, Introduction; Serhiy Pyrozhkov et al., *Causes and Consequences of Emigration from central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine*, Report to the Un Economic Commission for Europe, 1995, Introduction; Mirjana Morokvasic and Anne de Tinguy, "Between East and West: A New Migratory Space", in Hedwig Rudolph and Mirjana Morokvasic (eds.) *Bridging States and Markets. International Migration in the Early 1990s*, Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1993, pp.245-64; current press reports and government statistical materials on different categories of present-day East European migrants gathered by this author in the United States, Germany, and Poland.

12. It should be noted, however, that there exist considerable differences between countries in the level of economic development within Eat Central Europe: the 1995 per capita GNP, for example, in the Czech Republic was 46% and in Poland 30% of the average figure for Western Europe and North America combined.

The contemporary data were compiled from F.E. Ian Hamilton, "A Global Region in the Melting-pot?" *Geoforum*, 21(1990), pp. 151-153; Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980", *Journal of European Economic History*, 11(1982), esp. pp. 280-300; Gudrun Biffl (ed.) *Migration, Free Trade and Regional Integration in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wien, Verlag Osterreich, 1997, p.121, 323; Norbert Cyrus, "Flexible Work for

Fragmented Labor Markets", *Migration. A European Journal of International and Ethnic Relations*, v.26, 6 (1994), pp.97-123; Ivan Beren, *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pt.III, "Back to Europe? Post-1989 Transformation and Pathways to the Future."

A good source of information about wages earned (or earnable) abroad are also sociological surveys and ethnographic studies devoted to migration: see, e.g., Ewa Domaradzka, "Polacy Zatrudnieni Zagranica i Cudzoziemcy Pracujacy w Polsce", *Polityka Spoleczna*, special issue on contemporary problems of international migrations, v.274/275, 11/12 (1996), pp. 16-18; Wladyslaw Misiak, *Nowa Emigracja i Wyjazdy Zarobkowe Za Granice*, Wroclaw, Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne, 1991, , and idem, "Losy i Aktywnosc Polakow w Berlinie (Analiza Wynikow Badan 1994r)", *Slowo*, special issue on Poles in Berlin, Berlin, Polskie Duszpasterstwo Katolickie, 1995, pp.23-65; Bozena Karpiuk, *Emigracje Zarobkowe Mieszkancow Siemiatycz do Brukseli*, Ph.D. dissertation, Filia Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego w Bialymstoku, 1997, chap.6; Ewa Jazwinska and Marek Okolski (eds.) *Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*, Warsaw, Institute for Social Studies/ University of Warsaw, 1996, statistical tables of remittances sent by migrants to four home communities in Podlasie and Slask Opolski regions; Beata Siewiera, "Les immigres polonias sans documents", in Johan Leman (ed.) *Sans Documents: Les Immigrés de l'ombre*, DeBoeck Université 1995, pp.71-112; Tadeusz Poplawski, *Strategie Migracyjne i Sieci Powiazan*, unpublished ms, 1995; Norbert Cyrus, *Polnische Pendler/innen in Berlin*, unpublished ms, 1995; Leon Dyczewski, *Polacy w Bawarii*, Lublin, KUL,1993; Pyrozhkov et al., *Causes and Consequences of Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine*, pp.35-38; Sipavviciene et al., *International Migration in Lithuania: Causes and Consequences*; also American (esp. New York and Chicago), German (esp. Berlin), and Polish press reportages, 1995-1996, and interviews of this author with the legal consul at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland and with border guards at three checkpoints on the Polish-Ukrainian border, and with recent Polish and (Soviet) Jewish (e)migrants in Berlin, Germany and Philadelphia, USA in the summer of 1997 were also used in calculating estimates. The turn-of-the-century East-West wage ratio from Ewa Morawska, *For Bread with Butter: `Lifeworlds' of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890-1940*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.46.

13. On the sending side, the Russian government imposed, too, (e)migration controls by witholding exit passports for the petitioners from ethnic-national groups or political milieus considered "untrustworthy." Regarding the relatively open immigration policies of the receiving societies, especially the United States, it should be noted that throughout the entire period of turn-of-the-century mass immigration from South-Eastern Europe there continued there a heated public debate about the threats posed by those "culturally inferior" entrants and the means to control their influx until the latter was instituted in the 1920s (see John Higham, *Send These to Me*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975; Thomas Piktin, *Keepers at the Gate. A History of Ellis Island*, New York, NYU Press, 1975; Alan Kraut, *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace"*, New York, Basic Books, 1994; Patrick Weil, "Races at the Gate: The Rise and Fall of Racial Distinctions in American Immigration Policy, 1898-1952", paper presented at the conference Les Migrations dans une Perspective Historique, European University Institute, Florence, October 24-25, 1997).

14. The literature on (im)migration-related policies and ideologies and the tensions embedded therein is very considerable; see, e.g., Cornelius et al., *Controlling Immigration*; Aristide Zolberg, "International Migrations in Political Perspective", in Kritz et al., *Global Trends in Migration*, pp. 3-28; Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Posnational Membership in Europe*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994; Guy Goodwin-Gill,

"International Law and Human Rights: Trends Concerning Migrants and Refugees", in Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens (eds.) *Conceptualizing Global History*, pp. 526-546; David Martin, "Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of Hypocrisy", *ibid,*, pp. 547-578; Milton Essman, "The Political Fallout of International Migration", *Diaspora*, v.2, no.1, 1992, pp.3-41; James Hollifield, "The Migration Crisis in Western Europe: the Search for a National Model", in Klaus Bade (ed.) *Migration-Ethnizitat-Konflikt. Systemfragen und Fallstudien*, Osnabruck, Universtitatsverlag, 1996, pp.367-402; Anthony Fielding, "Migrants, Institutions and Politics: the Evolution of European Migration Policies", in King, *Mass Migrations in Europe. The Legacy and Future*, pp. 40-64; *Trends in International Migration*, Paris, OECD Sopemi, 1995, "Panorama of Migration Policies"; Gary Freeman, "Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States", *International Migration Review*, XXIX, 4 (1995), pp.881-913; Doris Meissner et al., *International Migration Challenges in a New Era: Policy Perspectives and Priorities for Europe, Japan, North America and the International Community*, New York, The Trilateral Commission, 1993; Michael Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995; see also Gérard Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national. Le droit d'asile en Europe, 1793-1993*, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 1993; Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control?*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996; Anthony Richmond, *Global Apartheid. Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1994.

15. In postwar history, this principle was first formulated in the UN declaration in 1948, and has since been amended and expanded in nearly 50 proclamations, more than one-fourth of which concern migrants and refugees, issued by international agencies at worldwide and regional levels, including the European Community.

16. The literature on the transformations characteristic of postindustrial societies is much too large to be cited here even fragmentarily; for cogent analyses, see, e.g., David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford Blackwell, 1990; Neil Postman, *Technopoly*, New York, Pantheon, 1992; Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford and Cambridge, Ma, Blackwell, 1996. In reference to international migrations, see Sasskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991.

17. On the history of tourism, see John Towner, "History and Tourism", *Annals of Tourism Research*, 18 (1990), pp. 71-84. In the western world the international tourism began to accelerate in the late 1960s, but because of the energy crisis slowed down or even declined, to resurge in the late 1970s; see *Summary of Developments in the Fields of World Economy, Demography, and Energy. Prospects for Tourism*, Madrid, World Tourism Organization, 1983. On tourism in the Soviet bloc, see Eva Kerpel, *Tourism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Prospects for Growth and New Market Oportunities*, Special Report No 2042, London, The Economist Intelligence Unit October 1990, p. 14f; also "Tourism in Centrally-Planned Economies", special issue of the *Annals of Tourism Research*, 17, 1(1990).

18. Data from *Tourism Development Report*, 1990, pp.376-385; *Annuaire des statistiques du tourisme*, 1989.

19. On the basis of survey and ethnographic studies of migration motives conducted in the 1990s: Jazwinska and Okolski, *Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*; Sipaviciene et al., *International Migration in Lithuania*; Pyrozhkov et al., *Causes and Consequences of Emigration from Cetral and Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine*; Siewiera,

"Les immigrés polonais sans documents", pp.70-112; Karpiuk, *Emigracje Zarobkowe Mieszkancow Siematycz do Brukseli*, 1997; Domaradzka, "Polacy Zatrudnieni za Granica i Cudzozmiemcy Pracujacy w Polsce"; Judith Kessler, "Judische Immigration seit 1990", *Migration und Soziale Arbeit*, 1 (1997), pp. 40-47; Julius Schoeps, Willi Jasper, and Bernhard Vogt, *Russische Juden in Deutschland*, Weinheim, Beltz Atheneum Verlag, 1996; Fran Markowitz, *A Community In Spite of Itself. Soviet Jewish Emigeres in New York*, Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993; CBOS and PBS surveys of (e)migration plans and motives of Poles, 1992-1996; press articles ("Polityka", 'Nowy Dziennik"-New York, "Samo Zycie"-Berlin, "Russkij Berlin",), author's interviews with 1980s-1990s Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, and Jewish (im)migrants in Philadelphia, USA; and with Polish and Jewish (im)migrants in Berlin, Germany; personal communications regarding recent Hungarian and Czech (e)migrants from Eva Csary and Jirzi Kostelka.

20. See Morawska, *For Bread with Butter*; and idem, *Insecure Prosperity: Small-town Jews in Industrial America, 1890-1940*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1996.

21. For bibliographic references to social survey and ethnographic studies relied on for these conclusions, see note #12 in this paper; I also used the information gathered during my own ongoing research on social microenvironments of contemporary Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish migrants in Germany and the United States.

22. *Poland: Statistical Data on Asylum Seekers and Refugees, 1993-1997*, Warsaw, Department of Migration and Refugee Affairs, Ministry of Interior and Administration, 1997; "Uchodzcy w Polsce" (editorial), *Nowy Dziennik*, August 8, 1997, p.2; Szoke, "Hungarian Perspectives on Emigration and Immigration", pp.305-23; Drusan Drbohlav and Ludek Sykora, "Gateway Cities inn the Process of Regional Integration in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Prague", in Biffl, *Migration, Free Trade, and Regional Integration in Central and Eastern Europe*, pp.215-38; Dovenyi and Vukovich, "Ungarn und die Internationale Migration"; Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya, "Auswanderung as der fruheren Sowjetunion un den GUS-Staaten."

23. On return migrations of East Central Europeans before World War I, see Nugent, , chap.9; Mark Wyman, , Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1993.

24. I have at present only data for Poland (from the opinion polls conducted by Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, CBOS, and press reports, 1992-1997), but accroding to my Czech and Hungaran colleague-students of recent international migrations into and from their countries, the situation there is similar.

25. For bibliographic references on the proportion of women among contemporary East European migrants, see syrvey and ethnographic studies listed in notes #12 and #26 in this paper; also , 1995--Central and East European migrations. On East European women migrants in the past, see Donna Gabbaccia, , Bloomington, In., Indiana University Press, 1994; Hoerder and Moch, , chap.4.

26. See Robert Brym, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk*, New York, NYU Press, 1994; Rita Simon, *New Lives. The Adjustement of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel*, Lexington, Ma, D.D. Heath, 1985; and idem, "Three Years Later: A Comparison of the Socioeconomic Adjustments and Jewish Identities among Soviet Jewish Emigres", New York, Federation of Jewish Philantropies, 1987; Barry Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States: An Analysis of Their Linguistic and Economic Adjustment", *International Migration Review*, v. XXVII, no.2, 1993, pp.260-85; Barry Edmoston and Jeffrey Passel, *Immigration and Ethnicity: The Integration of America's Newest Arrivals*, Washington,D.C., Urban Institute Press, 1994; Markowitz, *A Community in Spite of Itself*; Schoeps et al., *Russische Juden in Deutschland*,

chap.2; Judith Kessler, *Judische Migration aus der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion seit 1990. Beispiel Berlin*, Berlin, Eigenverlag,1996, chap.2; Jurgen Fijalkowski, *Judische Emigranten aus den Landern der Ehemaligen Sowjetunion*, Berlin, Auftrag der Auslanderbeauftragten des Senats von Berlin, 1992; Pt.2; Jeroen Doomrnik, *Going West. Soviet Jewish Immigrants in Berlin since 1990*, Aldershot, Avebury, 1997.

27. Information about tourists' pursuits from Pyrozkhov et al., *Causes and Consequences of Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine*, pp.5-7 and passim; Sipaviciene et al., *International Migration in Lithuania: Causes and Consequences*, Appendix 3; "Border Traffic and Expenses of Foreigners in Poland in 1994-1996", *Studia i Analizy Statystyczne*, Warsaw, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, 1997, pp.9-10; interviews of the author with the legal consul at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw and with border guards along Poland's eastern border--summer 1997. Of course, combining tourism with shopping is not unique for East (Central) Europeans: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are visited annually by millions of German tourists who do exactly the same. The latter, for example, spent in Poland one-half of the total 9 billion zloty expended by foreign visitors in 1995, a considerable part of it in (Polish side) border-region bazaars (Ewa Wilk, "Turysta czyli Zawodowiec", *Polityka*, August 24, 1996, p.52-53; also Joanna Solska, "Do Polski Jak do Sklepu", *Polityka*, August 20, 1994, p.IV.).

28. Information from Polish and German press reports, 1995-97, and from author's interviews with border guards along Poland's borders (summer 1997). The origin of new Polish colloquialisms for things stolen abroad and migrant-thieves: juma and jumacze, is not really known--they may have derived from the American western "15.10 to Yuma" depicting a lawless town and its normless residents--cf. Jacek Kurzepa, "Deprywacja Wspolczesnej Mlodziezy: Fenomen 'Jumy'" in Leszek Goldyka et al. (eds.) *Transgranicznosc w Perspektywie Socjologicznej*, Zielona Gora, Poligrafia Politechniki Zielonogorskiej, 1997, pp.233-52. Kurzepa, the author of a sociological study of young jumacze in a borderland town in western Poland, ascribes their illegal activities to the generalized sense of deprivation (see also, in the same volume, Wladyslaw Misiak, "Zjawiska patologii spolecznej w miastach przygranicznych", ibid., 117-128). Focused on the effects of open borders and increased back-and-forth migration along Poland's western border on the social and economic functioning of local towns and their residents, the volume *Transgranicznosc*, it should be noted, contains as well studies that document positive developments: the economic growth and the emergence of a new middle class (see, e.g., Maria i Daniel Ficowie, "Ekonomoczne korzysci ruchu granicznego dla rozwoju obszarow przygranicznych", ibid., 55-68, and Jerzy Leszkowicz Baczynski, "Rozwoj klasy sredniej w regionach przygranicznych jako efekt transformacji", ibid., 103-116.)

29. On present-day inter-European and global crime, with references to post-1989/90 East European involvement, see Richard Clutterbuck, *Terrorism, Drugs, and Crime in Europe After 1992*, New York, Routledge, 1992; Hans Leyendecker et al., *Mafia im Staat. Deutschland fallt unter die Rauber*, Gottingen, Steidl Verlag, 1992; Fabrizio Calvi, *L'Europe des Parrains. La Mafia à l'assaut de l'Europe*, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1993; Frances Heidensohn and Martin Farrell (eds.) *Crime in Europe*, London, Routledge, 1992; "Global Mafia", *Newsweek*, December 13, 1993, pp. 18-27. The Russian Mafia and its affiliates across the NIS (i.e., deep into Asia) and in the former satellites (including former East Germany) seem to control to a significant extent the market for gold and art objects (smuggled to the West); the contraband of western, mostly German, cars (to eastern Europe); selling of Soviet and East German military equipment (mostly to the Middle East, but also to Asia and Africa); and, increasingly and apparently in a ruthless war with its Italian competitor, the "Asian route" in the smuggling of drugs through Eastern Europe to Germany, and further west (see Arkady Vaksberg, *The Soviet Mafia*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991; Stephen Handelman, *Comrade Criminal*, New

Haven, Yale University Press, 1995; "Briefing on Crime and Corruption in Russia", U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1994; Christopher Ulrich, "The Price of Freedom. The Criminal Threat in Russia, eastern Europe, and the Baltic Region", working paper in the Conflict Series published by the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, October 1994; Heinrich Vogel, "Die 'Mafia' in Russland. Grunde fur die Explosion der Kriminalitat", *Internationale Politik*, 2, 1995, 11-18.

Information on the smuggling of people across Poland's borders from Emil Plywaczewski,ed., *Przestepczosc Cudzoziemcow*, Szczytno, Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Policji, 1995, and the author's interview with Emil Plywaczewski and with border guards along Poland's borders (summer 1997). On white slavery, Barbara Britt and Hans Peter Meister, *La Strada--Frauenhandel in Mittel-Ost-Europa*, Berlin, 1996; *Bericht der Berliner Fachkomission "Frauenhandel"* Berlin, Senatsverwaltung fur Arbeit, Berufliche Blidung und Frauen, 1997; author's interview with women's counselors at the Polonischer Sozialrat in Berlin (summer 1997).

30. Information from Kessler, *Judische Migration*,chap.2; Fijalkowski, *Judische Emigranten*, Pt.2; the author's interviews with Judith Kessler, Joel Levy, and Madeleine Tress (summer 1997).

31. Cyrus, "Flexible Work for Fragmented Labor Markets", pp.97-122; idem, "In Deutschland arbieten und in Polen leben. Was die neuen WanderarbeiterInnen aus Polen bewegt", in *Zwischen Flucht und Arbeit. Neue Migration und Legalisierungs debatte. Herausgegen von Buro Arbeitschwerpunkt Rassismus und Fluchtlings Politik*, Hamburg, Verlag Libertore Assoziation, 1995, pp.27-44; idem, *Pendel(rinnen) Migration*; survey and ethnographic studies of westbound migrations of East Europeans listed in note #12 in this paper; American, German, and Polish press reports, 1992-97; the author's interviews with legal counselor at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw about Ukrainian tourists working in Poland; with Andrzej Sadowski in Bialystok about local border migrations, with Wladyslaw Misiak about Polish border migrations to-and-from Germany, with the representatives of Polnischer Sozialrat in Berlin about illegal employment of East Europeans in Berlin; with Polish, Jewish, Russian, and Ukrainian recent (im)migrants in Philadelphia.

32. On female migrants' emloyment in domestic/nurturing occupations, see bibliographic references to survey and ethnographic studies of contemporary westbound migrations of East Europeans in note #12 in this paper. Information about migrant prostitution from Cyrus",Zur Situation irregularer polnischer Zuwanderinnen in Berlin", pp.13-19; *Bericht der Berliner Fachkomission "Frauenhandel"*, Berlin, 1997; series of reportages on cross-border prostitution in East Central Europe in *Wprost*, April-July, 1997; Britt and Meister, *La Strada*; Diana Hummel, "Lohende Geschafte: Frauenhandel Osteuropaerinnen der EG-Binnenmarkt", *Beitrage zur Feministische Theorie und Praxis*, #34, 1993, pp,59-69; Wiltrud Schenk, "Grenzgegerinnen", ibid., pp. 69-74; the author's interviews with women's counselors at the Polnisher Socialrat, Berlin. Figures on female unemployment from E. Buchajer and B.Kortus (eds.) *Polska i Niemcy. Geografia Sasiedztwa w Nowej Europie*, Krakow, Universistas, 1995, pp. 150-168; and the author's interview with the legal counselor in the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw (summer 1997). During my research in Berlin in the summer of 1997 I was told, and my inspection of the site confirmed what I heard, that there "camp" at the Berlin Banhoff Zoo underage boys from western Poland who come there--it takes a few hours by train--to prostitute themselves in order to earn monies for consumer goods.

33. On post-1989/90 brain drain from Eastern Europe, see Segal, *An Atlas of International Migration*, p. 153; Shevtsova, "Post-Soviet Emigration Today and Tomorrow", pp. 241-257; Okolski, "La nouvelle donne migratoire", pp.7 -39; Janusz Hryniewicz et al., *The Brain Drain*

in Poland, Warsaw, UW European Institute for Regional and Local Development, 1992, pp.35, 46-47; *Kultura*, Paris, March 1994, p.157 (editorial); *Trends in International Migration*, p. 107; Steven Erlanger, "A Cry of Pain Rises from the Soviet Science", *The New York Times*, November 21, 1993, 8E; Slanislav Simanovsky, "Brain Drain from the Former Soviet Union and the Position of the International Community", *Osteuropa-Wirtschaft*, 39 (1), pp.17-25; Barbara Rhode, "Brain Drain, Brain Gain, Brain Waste: reflections on the Emigration of Highly Educated and Scientific Personnel from Eastern Europe", in King, *The New Geography of European Migrations*, pp.228-45.

Although high-skill transfers between NW core countries have had primarily the "brain exchange" rather than "brain drain" character, it should be noted that some of this migration has displayed as well certain features of the latter, i.e., longer-term or even permanent relocation abroad of highly skilled workforce resulting from un- or underemployment in the home-country. For example, economic superpower as it is, Germany has a large number of such underused highly skilled manpower among younger-generation residents of former FRG--a combined product of the "rationalization" or shrinkage of employment in several high-tech industries, and overproduction of college graduates in such fields as economics and engineering, not to mention the notorious political and social sciences. As a result, many such superfluous professionals move abroad for several years in order to make a living there, often assisted in this project by the German state (compiled from *Statistisches Jahrbuch* 1993, p. 92; *From Higher Education to Employment*, Paris, OECD, 1990, vol. I, pp. 27-28). It may be of interest to note in this context that the term "brain drain" was first used in Great Britain in the 1960s to describe such outflows from that country (see David Manasian, "The Exodus of the Elite", *International Management*, vol. 43, no. 2, February 1988, pp. 54-56; Ronald Bailey, "Science and Technology: Brain Drain", *Forbes*, v. 144, no. 12, November 27, 1989, pp.262-63); see also John Salt, "Migration Processes Among the Highly-Skilled in Europe", *International Migration Review*, 26, 1992, pp.484-505.

34. American, German, and Polish press reports, 1992-96; Oberg and Boubnova, "Ethnicity, Nationality, and Migration", p. 254; *Trends in International Migration*, pp. 109-110; Blaschke, "Les travailleurs étrangers", p. 78; Okolski, "La nouvelle donne migratoire", p. 15; Hryniewicz, *Brain Drain in Poland*, pp. 15-18, 56-58; Kessler, *Judische Migration*, chapter 4; Fijalkowski, *Judische Emigranten*, chapter 4; Schoeps et al., *Russiche Juden in Deutschland*, chap.5; Chiswick, "Soviet Jews in the United States", pp.60-85; the author's interviews and personal observations in Philadelphia, U.S.A. and Berlin, Germany. A 1991 Polish survey found only about 30% (average) of highly skilled Poles who left their country in the early-to-mid-1980s to have held such jobs; the remaining experienced occupational skidding, falling into the "brain waste" subcategory (compiled from Okolski, "La donne migratoire inconnue", pp. 27-28).

35. Data from *Trends in International Migration*, 1995--Central and East European migrants; statistics for Saisonarbeitnehmer, Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer, and Gastarbeitnehmer from Eastern Europe in Germany, 1996 from Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Socialordnung made available to author by Norbert Cyrus; also Norbert Cyrus and Ewa Helias, *'Es ist moglich, die Baukosten zu senken.' Zu Problematik der Werkvertragsvereinbarubgen mit osteuropaischen Staaten seit 1991*, Berlin, Edition Parabolis, 1993; idem, *'Wir haben keine andere Wahl.' Zur Situation polnischer Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer in Berlin*, Berlin, Edition Parabolis, 1993; Hedwig Rudolph and Felicitas Hillman, "Labour Migration Between Eastern and Western Europe", *East Germany*, March 1995, pp.3-7; Hedwig Rudolph, "The new Gasterbeiter system in Germany", *New Community*, v.22, vo.2, 1996, pp.287-300.

36. Socially supported migration has been the inherent feature of most past and present travels from SE to NW regions of the world, and it has been the subject of a vast historical and sociological literature. On classic discussions of social networks as the main catalyst of social

life, see Howard Becker, *Man in Reciprocity*, Westport, Conn ., Greenwood Press, 1956; J. Clyde Mitchell, "Social Networks", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 1974, pp.279-99; Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties", *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (1973), pp. 1360-80.
On the role of social networks in supporting migration, see John MacDonald and Leatrice MacDonald, "Chain Migration, Ethnic Neighborhood Formation, and Social Networks", in Charles Tilly (ed.) *An Urban World*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974; Dirk Hoerder, "Segmented Macrosystems and Networking Individuals: The Balancing Functions of Migration Precesses", in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen (eds.) *Migration, Migration History, History. Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern-New York, Peter Lang, 1997, pp.73-86; Andrew Pohjola, "Social Networks--Help or Hindrance to the Migrant?" *International Migration*, v.XXIX, no.3, 1991, pp.435-444; for a comparative review of sociological and historical literature on this subject, see Ewa Morawska, "The Sociology and Historiography of Immigration", in Virginia Yans-McLaughlin (ed.) *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.187-241.

37. This "corrupt norm" or privatization of state structures has been one of the major components of the homo sovieticus syndrom across Eastern Europe--see Zvi Gittelman, "Working the Soviet System: Citizens and Urban Bureaucracies", in Henry Morton and Robert Stuart (eds.) *The Contemporary Soviet City*, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe, 1984, pp.221-243; Oleg Kharkhordin, "The Soviet Individual: Genealogy of a Dissimulating Animal", in Mike Featherstone et al., *Global Modernities*, London, Sage, 1994, pp.209-226; Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992; Janina Wedel, *The Private Poland*,New York, Facts on File Publications, 1986; Miroslawa Marody, "Z Mitem u Nogi", *Polityka*, October 18, 1997, pp.76-80.

38.On the volume of Handel in this Handeltourismus within the COMECOn and on the share of the informal econonmy in the GNP of Soviet-bloc countries, see Maria Los, *The Second Economy in Marxist States*, London, Macmillan, 1990; Marek Bednarski, "Drugi Obieg", *Zycie Gospodarcze*, August 26, 1984, p.35.

39. The author's observations at Poland's eastern, southern, and western border-crossing points, and interviews with border guards, tourist-traders, and their sending or receiving connections in Poland and Germany (summer 1997); Mariusz Urbanek, "Zagraniczny handel mrowek", *Polityka*, August 24, 1996, pp.50-51; Ewa Wilk, "Turysta czyli Zawodowiec", *Polityka*, August 24, 1996, pp.52-53; Mariola Balicka and Piotr Gajdzinski, "Bazary kaput", *Polityka*, May 24, 1997, pp.75-76; idem, "Przemyt bez granic", *Polityka*, January 4, 1997, pp.61-65; Adam Grzeszak, "Trup na lawecie", *Polityka*, December 21, 1996, pp.32-33, and idem, "Mrowki ze spirytusem", *Polityka*, November 22, 1997, pp.76-78.

40. Information from survey and ethnographic studies listed in note #12 in this paper and from the author's interviews with scholars studying present-day East European migrants in Poland, Germany, Belgium, and the United States (Andrzej Sadowski, Grzegorz Babinski, Wladyslaw Misiak, Leszek Goldyka, Hedwig Rudolph, Norbert Cyrus) and with the government officials dealing with issues of (in and out) migration and ethnic-group representatives in Germany, United States, and Poland (summer 1997).

41. Calculated on the basis of information obtained by the author from the legal counselor at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw and border guards at check-points along Polish-Ukrainian border (summer 1997); Drbohlav and Sykora, "Gateway Cities (...): The Case of Prague", pp. 225-26; Dovenyi and Vukovich, "Ungarn und die Internationale Migration", pp.263-84; Sipaviciene et al., *International Migration in Lithuania*, statistical appendix; Pyrozhkov, *Causes and*

Consequences of Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Ukraine, statistical appendix.

42. For survey and ethnographic studies of present-day East European migrations that served as the basis for the following discussion, see notes #12 and #26 in this paper. Historical information from Morawska, *For Bread with Butter*, chapters 1 and 2, and idem, "Labor Migrations of Poles in the Atlantic World-Economy", *Comparative Studies of Society and History*, v.31, no.2, 1989, pp.237-72; Nugent, *Crossings*, chaps. 8 and 9; Hoerder and Moch, *European Migrants*, pt.II.

43. The number of CIS Jews in Germany calculated from the statistics of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Hebrew Immigrant Society; Federal Administrative Bureau (Koln), and the World Jewish Congress. The proportion of Jewish immigrants in Berlin who gave the reasons for choosing Germany as their destination from Fijalkowski, *Judische Emigranten*, p.13.

44. See *Continuous Reporting System on Migration SOPEMI*, 1994; pp. 78-79; Pohjola, "Social Networks--Help or Hindrance to the Migrant?" pp. 435-441; *The Future of Migration*, pp. 276-77; Korcelli, "International Migrations in Europe", pp. 300-302; *The Changing Course of International Migration*, p. 109; Oberg and Boubnova, "Ethnicity, Nationality, and Migration Potentials", p. 251; *Tourism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, p. 97.

45. As already noted, informal social networks had been the major source of assistance for turn-of-the-century East European migrants, regardless of nationality and regional origin: they furnished information regarding possibile directions of migration: e.g., between 1900 and 1906, over 8 million letters circulated between the United States and Europe, and provided aid in organizing transport: 45%-60%, the proportion similar to contemporary figures, of overseas ship tickets were prepaid by family or friends, and intra-Continental seasonal workers traveled in groups sharing costs (for bibliographic references see note #42 in this paper).

46. See note #43 in this paper for the main Jewish organizations in charge of ressetlement of (post-)Soviet Jews; the agencies connected with the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption are, of course, also involved in assisting those who come to that country. On the assistance extended to German Aussiedlers, see, e.g., Rainer Munz et al., *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland, Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven*, Frankfurt, Camous Verlag, 1997, chap.6.

47. On local differences in the amount knowledge about the living and working conditions in the host country, and about its social service system, see Jazwinska and Okolski, *Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*, pp.137-57. In Siemiatycze, a small Polish town from which waves of migrants have regularly traveled to Brussels, the local paper published an advisory list of practical "should nots" for future illegal worker-migrants (after Karpiuk, *Emigracje Zarobkowe Mieszkancow Siematycz do Brukseli*, p.44).

48. After Poplawski, *Strategie Migracyjne i Sieci Powiazan*, pp.15-18.Somewhat suprisingly, a majority of (post-)Soviet Jews emigrating to the United States and to Germany display minimal or none whatsoever knowledge about the functioning of the political and social systems of the countries they move to, despite the involvement in ther transplantation of well-informed host-country Jewish organizations (information from Schoeps et al., *Russische Juden in Deutschland*, pp.77-114; the author's interview with Madleine Tress from the New York HIAS, August 1997, and interviews with Jewish immigrants in Philadelphia, 1996-97). Two possible reasons for this state of affairs may be that, on the one hand, Jewish emigrants use these organizations mainly instrumentally as "travel agencies" and facilitators social-service providers during the first stage

of their stay in the new country rather than as the source of information about the latter, and, on the other hand, that Jewish organizations are--exactly what they are, Jewish, and focus on the in-group assistance without providing much information about the larger society's operation.

49. On the blindness of turn-of-the-century NW commentators on South and East European migrant workers' "low expectations" to the latter's homeward reference frameworks, that is, their achievement orientations as informed by old-country standards, see Ewa Morawska, "Une vision 'revisitee': les immigres Slaves vus par le Pittsburgh Survey", *Les Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, v.99, Septembre 1993, pp.65-78.

50. Information about German welfare provisions for refugees from Madeleine Tress, "Soviet Jews in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Rebuilding of a Community", *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, v.37, no.1, 1995, p.48; about the percentage of Jewish immigrant families on welfare from Fijalkowski, *Judische Emigranten*, pp.21-26; the figure on organizational involvement from the author's interview with Judith Kessler, Berlin, July 1997. On social welfare provisions for refugees (here: Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union) in the United States, see Simon, *New Lives. The Adjustment of Soviet Jewish Immigrants in the United States and Israel*, pp.22-24, 60-64, 106-107, 156-59; the proportion of "unorganized" Jewish immigrants in American cieties has been similar to that reported in Germany.

51. After Jeroen Doomernik, "Soviet Jewish Immigrants in Berlin and their Strategies of Adaptation to German Society", *Gesellschaften im Umbruch. Verhandlungen des 27.Kongresses der Deutscher Gesellschaft fur Sociologie in Halle an deSaale 1995* , Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 1996, pp.413-27.

52.The author's interviews with social workers at the Polnischer Socialrat in Berlin, July and August 1997; *Kiedy? Co? Kto? Gdzie? Jak? Poradnik dla Polakow w Berlinie*, Berlin, Polnischer Sozialrat, 1995/96.

53.Information from the legal counselor at the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, (July 1997).

54. On the relationship between the individual position in the social structure and his/her psychological orientation: specifically, self-reliance, self-confidence, personal responsibility for own life, and the increased frequency of the latter among those better positioned socioeconomically in the ongoing transformation of Eastern Europe, see Melvin Kohn et al., "Social Structure and Personality under Conditions of Radical Social Change: A Comparative Analysis of Poland an Ukraine", *American Sociological Review*, v.62, August 1997, pp.614-38. In his recent study of Soviet Jews in Berlin, Jeroen Doomernik (1997) calls the above orientation "innovative" as opposed to (Soviet-style) "conservative"; I have used here the Mertonian concept of "innovation" which is different from the conventional (and Doomernik's) understanding of the term; in this approach, "conservative" behaviors of (e)migrants are, precisely, innovative as flexible, ingenuous ways to overcome the legal-institutional obstacles preventing them from realizing their goals.

55. Grzegorz Zietkiewicz, *Polen in Berlin-Polacy w Berlinie*, Berlin, Die Auslanderbeauftragte des Senats, 1986, pp.46-57; the author's interviews with Mr. Jacek Barelkowski, chairman of the Association of Polish Businessmen in Berlin, Berpol, and with Dr. Michal Godel, chairman of the Association of Polish Medical Doctors in Berlin (August 1997).

56. The above conclusions have been based on studies of Jazwinska and Okolski, *Causes and Consequences of Migration in Central and Eastern Europe*, pp.198-201; Karpiuk, *Emigracje Zarobkowe*, chap. VI; Siewiera, "Les immigres polonias sans docments", pp.107-108;

Poplawski, *Strategie Migracyjne*, p.16; Domaradzka, "Polacy Zatrudnieni za Granica i Cudzoziemcy Pracujacy w Polsce", pp.16-18 (Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Russians, and Lithuanians constituted 90% of Domaradzka's foreign sample); the author's interviews with Polish temporary undocumented worker-migrants in Berlin and Philadelphia (1996-97), with the legal counselor of the Ukrainian Embassy in Wasraw, and with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian returning migrants at the check-points along Poland's eastern border (summer 1997).

On the combined impact of post-Communist transformations, borderland location (specifically, Polish-German borderland) and border-migrations on the development of a new middle class and new entrepreneurial, self-reliant orientations among high school students in that area, see, respectively, Leszkowicz Baczynski, "Rozwoj klasy sredniej w regionach przygranicznych jako efekt transformacji",pp.103-116; and Leszek Goldyka, "Miasto pogranicza polsko-niemieckiego jako srodowisko wychowawcze", in Goldyka et al. (eds.) *Transgranicznosc w Perspektywie Socjologicznej*, pp.153-64.

57. I identified three studies in which (im)migrants' transnational identity is considered at some (not extensive) length: Jazwinska's and Okolski's *Causes and Consequences of Migration in East Central Europe*, pp.201-202 and, in passing, chapter VI; and Fran Markowitz's "Emigration, Immigration, and Cultural Change: Towards a Trans-national "Russian'-Jewish Community?" in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.) *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union*, New York, Frank Cass, 1995, pp.403-13.

58. The distinction between Vaterland and Heimat is Stanislaw Ossowski's--a Polish sociologists who wrote on the emergence of modern nationalism ("Analiza Socjologiczna Pojecia Ojczyzny" (Sociological Analysis of the Concept of Fatherland) in Stanislaw Ossowski, *Z Zagadnien Psychologii Spolecznej*, Warsaw, PWN 1967, pp.201-35. The concept of "imagined communities" is of course Benedict Anderson's from his book *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso Editions, 1983.

59. Quote from L.G., "Les Colonies Lithuaniennes aux Etats-Unis", *Annals des Nationalites*", 2, 1913, pp.231-32--cited in Robert Park, *The Immigrant Press and Its Control*, New York, 1922, p.51. A similar development was noted by the contemporary observers of other East and South European groups--see Ewa Morawska, "Changing Images of the Old Country in the Development of Ethnic Identity among East European Immigrants, 1880s-1930s: A Comparison of Jewish and Slavic Representations", *Yivo Annual of Jewish Social Science*, v.21, 1993, pp.273-341; George Pozetta, "Italian Americans: The Ongoing Negotiation of an Ethnic Identity", in Kathleen Conzen et al., "The Invention of Ethnicity", *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 12 (1) 1992, 26-32. So intense was this preoccupation with the home country Otcestvo, or Fatherland, that the American (read: German and Irish) Catholic church hierarchy and educational institutions, with whom Slavic immigrants battled over language rights in parish and classroom were commonly depicted as "extensions" of home-country enemies, such as, in the case of Poles referring to the situation in their then partitioned Homeland, "Prussian policemen", "Muscovite spies", and so on.

For an interesting discussion of the enduring homeward nationalism of immigrants in America, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Special Sorrows. The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States*, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1995.

60. See Wyman, *Round Trip to America*; also Hoerder and Moch, *European Migrations*; Nugent, *Crossings*. The return figures for Jews who, unlike Slavs and Italians, left for America with intentons of permanent resettlement were significanly smaller, about 7% for that period (although a suprisingly high 20-odd per cent returned to Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1900)--see Jonathan Sarna, "The Myth of No Return: Jewish Return Migration to Eastern

Europe, 1891-1914", *American Jewish History*, 71 (1981), 256-69. On the role of immigrant foreign-language press in sustaining their old-country ties and indentities and at the same Americanizing, see Park, *The Immigrants Press and Its Control*; Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder (eds.) *The Press of Labor Migrants in Europe and America, 1880s-1930s*, Bremen, 1985. "Prussian policemen" and "Muscovite spies" from the author's file on the beginning-of-this-century Slavic press in America.

To this symbolic preoccupation with the old country can be added repeated attempts during the first half of this century by the political elites of Italy, Ukraine, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania to mobilize "their" emigrants' national loyalty and to engage them for home political purposes or to squash their political activites deemed subversive; the importation of new political ideas and practices into hometowns and villages by returning "Amerikancy" migrants; and the spilling from the streets into the city halls of American cities of clashes between different groups of migrants over home-centered nationalist issues.

61. Quote after Paul Arthur, "Diasporan Intervention in International Affairs: Irish America as a Case Study", *Diaspora*, 1(2), 1991, p.144.

62. On anti-foreign sentiments and discriminatory practices during the period of mass migrations from South and East Europe and throughout the interwar era, see John Higham, *Send These to Me. Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America*, New York, Atheneum, 1975.

63. This sense of legitimacy and entitlement permits immigrants'/ ethnics' involvement in American politics focused on racial/ethnic (or panethnic) and related transnational issues which they express, often with unconcealed frustration or anger, in public demands or protest, for example, regarding attempted deportation of illegal (im)migrants or the lack of social service provisions for them. Contained in these political demands and protests formulated in racial/ethnic-panethnic-transnational terms, is the issue of (globalized) class inequality and injustice.

64. I borrowed the idea of applying Hannerz's concept of creolization to identities of transmigrants from the essay of Nina Glick Schiller et al., "Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, v.645, no.6, 1992, pp.1-24. Michael Kearney describes such multifaceted, malleable identities of contemporary (im)migrants as "coalesc[ing] as ethnicity, as an ethnic consciousness, which is the supremely appropriate form for identity to take in the age of transnationalism"--see his "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire", *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 4, March 1991, pp.52-73 (the quoted fragment on p.62); an interesting attempt sociologically to analyze such asystematic identities can be found in Khachig Tololyan's "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", *Diaspora*, v.5, no.1, 1996, pp.3-35; also Robin Cohen, "Diaspora, the Nation-State, and Globalisation", in Wang Gungwu (ed.) *Global History and Migrations*, Boulder, Co., Westwood Press, 1997, 117-45.

65. On post-Soviet-Jewish and-German "creole" or mixed emigrant identities, see, respectively, Markowitz, "Emigration, Immigration, and Social Change", pp.403-13; Munz, *Zuwanderung nach Deutschland*, chap.6; but see Irene Runge, *"Ich bin kein Russe. Judische Zuwanderung zwischen 1989 und 1994* (Berlin, 1995, Dietz Verlag) for an account of one-nationality (Jewish) only immigrant identity in Berlin. I did not find in the existing studies any information on (trans)national identities of German Aussiedler-emigrants from Poland, but I encountered a number of such persons in Polish gathering places in Berlin, and their involvement in Polish emigre life in that city, and their interest in Polish matters have been reported to me by the organizational leaders of the Berlin Polish community (summer 1997).

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